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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The congressional elections of 1994 rocked Washington and the country with the
ousting of the Democratic party's long-standing control of the Congress. Less than two
years later radical welfare reductions were signed into law by the democratic president.
The reemergence of conservative ideology has brought calls for the slashing of
government programs and a renewed zeal for the free market. This enthusiasm for the
market mechanism rests on the belief that unfettered economic exchange will yield the
most efficient allocation of resources to society. This belief is based on the implicit
assumption that markets tend to be competitive in the absence of governmental
intervention. Given the growing demand to limit the government's direct intervention in
matters of the economy, it is imperative to know if and when markets are competitive.
The solution to this question has been at the root of industrial organization since
the 1950' s with the early empirical work of economist Joe Bain. It is now over forty years
later and there is still a lack of a definitive answer to this fundamental query. It is not
from lack of effort - hundreds of theoretical and empirical papers have been published on
this topic. Why the answer should be so elusive stems largely from two basic limitations
to economic inquiry:
I) Explicit and implicit political values influencing research.
2) The difficulty in applying the experimental design to economic questions.
The two are related of course, but each plays its own role in preventing economists - and
society - from reaching definitive conclusions to economic problems.
This paper is not a discourse on the subjective (political) nature of economic
analysis, hut it is important to briefly touch upon the political ramifications inherent in
conclusions about market performance. Conservative economists tend to produce theory
and research thut show thai the US economy is largely comprised of competitive
industries. These results provide the bases for arguments that government intervention in
the form of regulations and anti-trust litigation is unnecessary and even damaging to the
economy.
Far from being destructive, liberal economists tend to view government
intervention as an important component in ensuring the efficient operation of the
economy. Liberal economists often reach the conclusion that concentrated industries are
uncompetitive - supporting regulation policies and anti-trust action. Of course, in
economics there are more than these two general views but much of industrial
organization can be viewed as a struggle between the Conservative-Liberal dichotomy.
Harold Demsetz clearly saw the role of ideology when he cautioned "believing is seeing."
(Scherer and Ross j 990, p.447)
While the root of conflict within industrial organization tends to be political, the
explicit focus of scholarly writings tends to be on methodological issues. The variety of
arguments over the correct approach to test market competitiveness - tbe absence of
market power - is a reflection of the difficulty in applying the scientific paradigm to
economics. The sheer number of potential economic relationships and the possibility that
all economic objects are overdermined - both the causes and effects of every other object
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- renders a true controlled experiment a virtual impossibility for the economist (Wolf and
Resnick, 1987 p. 20).
That said. it should also be pointed out that the degree to which empirical
economics strays from the ideal is diminishing. With progress in computational ability
and improvements in data collection, economic analysis is becoming increasingly
tocused. Assertions of overdetcrminism aside, as technology improves our ability to
capture and analyze information, results 1'1'0111 empirical economic research will become
much more robust.
An example of resent advances in data collection is the use of computer scanners
at supermarket checkout lines. Information about each product is stored on a bar code
printed on a product's package. The bar card is read by the checkout scanner at the point
of purchase. This information is then captured and saved in a computer database. The
result IS a database that has a wealth of information about the sale of branded products -
including price, size, and some marketing information - over time and across markets.
This type of data -unheard of only a few years ago- provides the opportunity to
apply theoretically defined empirical demand models to the study of competition. In the
past such models were difficult to apply due to severe data limitations. It is now possible
to estimate the demand conditions for branded products within specific industries where
this data is collected.
Demand conditions are the changes in consumer purchases due to price and
marketing changes made by firms. Consumers' reactions to market changes are often
measured as elasticities - a percent change in demand due to a percent change in price or
marketing van abies. For example, a percent change in price will correspond to a certain
percentage change in quantity demanded. The demand elasticity for a given firm's
product depends in part on the market structure of the industry.
The market structure of an industry can take several forms. The major market
types are listed below in Table 1. Market structure in this schema is determined by both
the number of competitors and the existence of product differentiation.
Table 1
Principal Seller's Market Structure Types
N umber of Sellers
One A Few Many
Products
Homogeneous Pure Homogeneous Pure
monopoly oligopoly competition
Differentiated Pure multiproduct Differentiated Monopolistic
- ---- monopoly '- oli~opoly comp,e0ti0!1_ ------
Source: Scherer and Ross, 1990
In general economists agree to theory pertaining to monopoly and pure competition. It is
difficult. however, to find the exact demarcation between oligopolistic and competitive
markets.
"The key to the distinction is subjective - whether or not the sellers
consider themselves conscious rivals .... If the sellers are sufficiently few
in number to have each believe (a) that its economic fortunes are
perceptibly influenced by the market actions of other individual firms, and
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(h) that those firms are in turn affected significantly by its own actions,
then the market can be said to be oligopolistic". (Scherer and Ross, 1990.
r 17)
The propensity for this awareness increases as the number of firms in the market
decreases.
According to Scherer and Ross: "Pure monopolists, oligopolists, and monopolistic
competitors share a common characteristic: each recognizes that its output decisions have
ible infl . Allh kt I"a percepu ) III uenee on pnce . . . tree types possess ... mar 'e power .
(Scherer and Ross, 1990 p. [7) Firms that leverage market power extract profits by
pricing above marginal costs. Market power can be neutralized, however, if entry in and
out of the market by new firms is free and frictionless.
Pricing strategies that raise price above marginal cost can only be maintained if
entry of new firms is restricted. Barriers to entry prevent the self-correcting mechanism
of increased competition from forcing prices back to cost levels. A monopoly that does
not enjoy this form of protection will not realize profit because any positive difference
between price and cost will be immediately eliminated due to instantaneous entry by
competitors. However, such instantanious entry is limited in real markets but the extent
of barriers to entry has become a central element of market structure.
The complexity of market models incorporating strategic behavior has stymied
economists seeking a simple and clear theory for markets with few firms. There are two
primary approaches to carrying out market power analysis. The first is to study several
"italicized in original
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industries at Once to see if general results hold across industries. These studies tend to be
structural profit studies, where profit is regressed on some comhmation of concentration
and market share. The second is the case study approach which analyzes a single industry
for market power. Although a more detailed discussion of the different approaches is
found in chapter two, this thesis uses the case study approach to estimate brand-level
price clast icitics in the margarine industry.
The primary objectives of this paper are:
I) to apply newly available retail data to estimate brand level elasticities
2) to test for market power in the form of differentiation for the margarine industry.
Until recently elasticities have been estimated only at the industry level. This has
provided economists with aggregate measures of demand useful in comparing different
industries but not very useful at comparing brands within an industry. If the brand level
price elasticities are small in absolute value (less than 100) than the products are
differentiated from one another. Product differentiation creates market power.
The estimated price elasticities for individual brands of margarine will be used to
determine if margarine is differentiated and therefore not perfectly competitive. The
margarine industry was chosen because of the availability of scanner data needed for the
detailed estimations and unlike its complement product, butter, margarine has achieved a
degree of product differentiation despite a minimal degree of physical differentiation
among brands.
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Even before estimating elasticities the possible market structures (in Table I) for
margarine can be reduced. In 1992 there were no less than 103 margarine brands
produced by 47 different manufactures, thus Monopoly, both pure and multi-product, is
ruled out. A four firm concentration ratio of 80%,and an advertising sales ratio of 4.3 %
suggests a differentiated oligopoly.
To complicate matters many manufactures sold more than one brand. In 1992
"the average number of brands sold by a manufacturer was 2.14 brands, it
varied from 24 brands by Unilever to just one brand per firm. Philip
Morris marketed the next highest number of brands with nine; followed by
Borden Inc. with six; Nabisco with four; and Dean Foods, Sunnyland,
PYO INTL., Miami Margarine, Cl'C International and Osceola Foods each
with three. Ten manufacturers marketed two brands and the rest had one
brand each. Although the majority of the manufacturers marketed more
than a single brand only the top five market more than three brands."
(Andonov 1995, pp 17-18)
It was noted that margarine tends to be similar across brands. It might be
expected that each brand is an almost perfect substitute - consumers view brands as
equivalent- for any other brand. If this were true we would expect to see one price for all
brands -equal goods should sell at equal prices. A look at margarine prices for 1992 in
Table 2 suggests that - product similarities aside - margarine brands are not perfect
substitutes, although here we do not control for the location of the retail market.
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Table 2
Frequency Distrihution of the Price per Pound of Branded Margarine
for the 6205 Observations, 1992'
Maraarine Prices in Dollars Freuuencv
less than 0.30 6
0.30 - 044 737
045 - 0.59 755
060 - 0.74 1007
0.75 - 0.89 917
0.90 - 1.04 715
105 - 1.19 60S
120 - 1.34 694
1.35 - 149 656
1.50 - 1.64 385
165 - 1.79 168
180 - 194 44
ereater than 1.94 16
Source: (Andonov, 1995)
Table 2 is made up of margarine prices taken from 65 regional markets over the
four quarters of 1992. Prices for the most expensive margarine in Table 2 are over six
times that of the lowest priced brands. The large price differences and the existence of
multi-brand firms strongly suggest that the margarine industry is differentiated.
'All brands in the 65 markets and all four quarters of 1992 are included here.
This thesis will test if the margarine industry is differentiated by directly
estimating the own and cross-price elasticities of demand of the major national brands. It
is expected, gIven the range of prices, that different margarine brands are not perfect
substitutes - rcxult inj; In relatively low own price elasticities. Relationships between the
brands will be reflected in the cross-price elasticities. The size of the cross-price
elasticities indicate the degree of substitutability between brands - the larger the cross-
price elasticity the greater the substitutability.
A first order di fferential demand model is used as the functional form for the
elasticity estimation. The differential model has the benefit of being less complex than
empirical demand models more consistent with utility theory, such as the Almost Ideal
Demand System (AIDS). In addition, the differential demand model is consistent with
utility theory if consumers' utility functions are of the Gorman form. This will be
discussed in detai] in chapter three.
The empirical work in this thesis uses a two stage-budgeting model for the
theoretical tramcwork. Consumers are assumed to initially allocate expenditures to broad
product categories. Products are then chosen based on the prices of only the products
within each broad product group.
Margarine is divided into two product groups, regular margarine and spread.
There are six brands in the regular category and eight in the spread category. The
elasticities of each brand are estimated as a system for each category, i.e., the regular and
spread brands are estimated as two separate systems. The next stage estimates the
elasticities for the regular and spread product groups. Using two regression equations,
representing the aggregate demand for regular and spread margarine. The final stage is a
demand equation for all margarine. Figure I helps visualize the nested allocation process
of the two-stage budget system. These stages are represented in the margarine utility tree
starting with the industry level at the left and moving to the brand level at the right of the
figure.
Figure]
Utility Tree For the Margarine Industry
Industry Segment Brand
I Fleischmanns I
II Imperial
Land 0' Lakes I
I RegularI Segment Mazoia I
II Parkay
I Private Label I
I Margarine lndt.xtry f-
IBlue Bonnet
I CMB
ICBlNB II Spread l
I Segment IParkay Light
Promise I
II Shedds
I Shedds CC I
I Pri vale Label I
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The next chapter is a review of the industrial organization literature. Chapter
Three focuses on the theory used to specify the empirical model used in this thesis.
Chapter Four reviews the objectives of the study, discusses the data sources and presents
some descriptive statistics. Chapter Five reports the empirical results of the analysis.
Finally, Chapter Six presents the conclusions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERA TliRE REVIEW
The industrial organization literature is extensive, particularly for the past forty
years. The early work comprised mostly structure-conduct-performance studies. These
studies examined and tested the relationship between market structure and profit rate.
Economists believed that higher industry concentration (few suppliers) facilitated market
collusion, which in turn lead to higheer industry profits.
To test tbis hypothesis, a measure of concentration is regressed on industry profit,
along with several other variables. A positive, and statistically significant, coefficient for
the concentration measure is interpreted as evidence that profit increased with industry
concentration. For over twenty years tests of this sort predominantly found a positive
concenrrution-profit relationship existed, although counter-arguments were made that
either thc studies were flawed or the interpretation was wrong.
Morc recently, economists have been concerned with the structure-performance
studies lack of theoretical grounding. Alternative tests of market power have been
derived that are anchored to economic theory by directly estimating market power
througb rigorously specified empirical models. This direct approach is known as the new
empirical industrial organization (NEIO).
While the NEIO bas made significant inroads, it bas yet to be enthusiastically
embraced by practitioners of tbe traditional methods. Direct estimation of market power
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often requires unrealistic assumptions of market conditions', as well the imposition of
arbitrary functional forms. While economists disagree about methodology, the question
they seek to answer is the same - are markets operating efficiently?
Economists look to perfect competition for the benchmark for efficiency. The
measure of efficiency used by economists is Pareto efficiency. An allocation is Pareto
efficient if there is no possible change to an allocation such that an individual or set of
individuals is made better off without injuring others. The results of the first welfare
theorem indicate that perfectly competitive markets will be Pareto efficient. It follows
then, that the benchmark for market efficiency is perfect competition.
Competitive Performance
The neoclassical model of a perfectly competitive market consists of many
individual buyers purchasing a homogeneous good or service from many suppliers. The
buyers, each competing with his or her fellow buyer, will tend to bid up the price of the
good. Simultaneously, the suppliers compete with one another to sell and will tend to bid
the price down. With many equal sized suppliers, the competition to sell is so fierce that
price is driven down to the cost of producing the good. It is not without some irony that
each group's objective, low price for buyers and high price for suppliers, is sabotaged by
each individual pursuing his or her self interest.
This interaction between buyers and sellers is the standard supply and demand
taught in introductory economics courses. Market price is determined when market
; For example many studies have used a Gormon polar form of the cost function, which
leads to equal marginal costs across firms.
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supply equals market demand where market supply and demand are the sums of
individual supply and demand curves respectively. The individual suppliers, or firms, are
motivated by profit defined as total revenue minus total cost. Total revenue (TR) is
market price multiplied by the quantity sold. Total cost (TC) is determined by
multiplying the quantity sold by the average total cost (ATC) and then adding the fixed
cost of production. Firms seeking maximum profit, wil1 produce up to the point that the
marginal cost of production equals the marginal revenue. More formally, the objective
function or a profit maximizing firm is :
( J ) max p « '1, - C(q,) i = I, ... .n.
Poq, is the total revenue (TR) firm i receives for selling amount q, . C (TC) is the cost
function firms face when producing. In this simplified model all cost functions are the
same for cach finn. Additional1y, price is also the same across firms so that P is a market
pnce.
The first order condition is :
(2) p = c".
At the optimal profit level marginal revenue equals market price (P)
and therefore price equals marginal cost (c').
Interdependence
Industrial organization tests the assumption that markets are characterized by
perfect competition. Often industries are dominated by a few large firms (oligopolies)
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with several fringe firms. The traditional structure-conduct-performance empirical
models use the basic industrial organization paradigm as a guide for research.
This paradigm asserts that in actual markets firms can capitalize by realizing their
interdependence. If the number of firms is low, the potential exists for individual firms to
stem supply without rivals stepping in to offset the restriction. The oligopoly restricts
supply to raise market price, which leads to profit. This is a shift from the static first order
condition of equation (2) to dynamic behavior of strategic decision making.
Inter-industry interdependence is modeled in the profit maximizing conditions by
writing price as a function of market quantity. If there are N homogeneous firms then the
iii' firm's optimization problem is:
(3) max P(Q)oq,-c,o(q,J
Where the first order condition is:
(4) P + (dP/OQ)o(dQldq,J0q,=C,
which can be rewritten as
(5) P + p(ap I dQ)(QI PH I + ,1.)5, = C,
reorganizing to get the equality
(6) (P-C,)
P =
5,0(/+,1.)
E
where
S, = firm i's share of the market
I:= price elasticity of demand
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P = market price
C· . I forth .th f1 ::= margma cost lor tel urn
Q = total industry quantity
q, = firm i's output.
A = conjectural variation
The left-hand side of equation (6) is known as both the price-cost margin and the Lerner
index. The index is a unit free measure of a firm's profits bounded between zero and one;
the former indicating normal profit. As price exceeds marginal cost, profits are higher.
The conjectural variation (A) is how firm i believes firrn j will respond to a change in is
production". Often A is assumed to be zero, mostly for simplicity, because there is no
easy way to predict firms' reactions to rivals' output decisions.
The relationship suggested by (6) is the crux of structure-conduct-performance
studies. In (6) we sec that profitability is a function of both demand conditions (E) and
market structure (S, and A). In the case of monopoly, S, is equal to one. In perfect
competition S, is equal to zero because a firm's market share approaches zero as the
number of firms increases. When S, is zero the Lerner index is also zero - price equals
margi nul cost.
Equation (6) shows that an industry's structure, or concentration, will affect the
market price. Although causation is not clear in equilibrium conditions, it is traditionally
'This is assumes a Cournot case. In a Bertrand example the conjecture is in prices.
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hypothesized that an increase in industry concentration will lead to market power and
cause price to exceed marginal cost. Models that test the concentration-market power
relationship need to have appropriate measures for industry concentration.
Concentration Measures
There are several statistical measures of industry concentration. The best measure
depends on the availability or data and the specific use. Good measures reflect major
structural changes over time, reveal differences in structural power within distinct
markets and firms, and accurately predict market performance (Greer, 1992).
In an industry with many firms, a single firm may be supplying most of the
market, and hence have a high market share. A firm with high market share may exercise
market power even in an industry with many firms. A useful concentration measure,
therefore, needs to account for size differences of the firms.
For example, the concentration ratio (CR-N, where N is the number of firms used
in the numerator) attempts to account for both the absolute number of firms and their size
distribution. The CR-N is calculated by finding "the percentage of total market sales
accounted for by a given number of leading firms (Greer, 1992)." A four-firm
concentration ratio (CR4) would be the percent of an industry's market share held by the
top four firms. Besides providing a meaningful reflection of the size distribution, the
concentration ratio is also easy to understand (Greer, 1992).
The concentration ratio is useful but limited as a measure of industry structure.
The concentration ratio does not capture the entire size distribution for all firms. This
adds to the difficulty in comparing the level of concentration between industries. While
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one industry may have a higher CR4, it is possible that another industry has a higher CR2
or CR8.
The concentration ratio also lacks information about the relative size of individual
firms in the top category. Even if a particular CR4 measure were superior to other
concentration ratios, it would still lack information about size distributions of those four
firms. Other indexes have been developed to allow for both size and number of firms.
One frequently used is the Herfindahl-Hirschman (H) index. It is derived by
summing the squares of firm size, where firm size is represented as the percentage of
industry sales. More formally:
(7) H = 2:(1,;' Ii= J,2,3"n)
Where s, is firm i :« percent of market share and n is the total number of firms in the
industry. In a monopoly s; equals 100 percent, the H index is one hundred squared, or
10,000. If the industry is perfectly competitive" and H approaches zero as no individual
firm has any discernible market share. (Greer, 1992) If all firms are of equal size then
H=I/N.
The H index is widely used because it reflects the effects of both finn size and the
number of firms in the market. By squaring the market share, the impact of larger firms
is given greater weight tban smaller firms. However, the H index is not necessarily better
than the concentration ratio. The choice of the concentration measure is debatable and
dependent upon the given problem. Fortunately, few empirical studies seem sensitive to
the choice of either H or the CR4.
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Price-cost Margin
Early research tcndcd to avoid using market price as a dependent variable for
various reasons. The early work was cross-sectional, which would require the
comparison of prices between diverse industries. To avoid the problems of comparing
apple prices to those of jet engines, researchers have typically used profitability instead of
price as thc dependent variable.
The industry price-cost margin is a frequent measure of an industry's profitability;
it can be derived from equation (6). Rewriting (6) into an industry's price cost margin
form:
(8) - H(P-MC)IP=-
E
Here Me is the industry's weighted average of firms' marginal costs. The variable H is
the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index from equation (7) (Scherer and Ross, 1990
p.2(0). The left-hand side of equation (8) is the industry's price-cost margin (PCM). The
more concentrated the industry, the higher H and in turn the higher the PCM. The PCM,
therefore, is a positive function of the industry's concentration (H).
A market power explanation for this positive relationship is that firms in
industries with high concentration can collude, or follow a dominant firm, ensuring
higher profits (Clarke, Davies, and Waterson, ]984). This argument is presented by
Schmalensee as the Differential Collusion Hypothesis (DCH):
"Industries differ in the effectiveness with which sellers are able to limit
competition by tacit or explicit collusion. Collusion is more likely to be
effective, and profitability is more likely to be above competitive levels,
the higher the seller concentration (Schmalensee, ]987)."
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Through collusion (explicit or tacit) oligopolistic firms exercise market power by raising
price. By increasing price, the collusive firms can extract economic profits as market
price rises above ATC. This has led researchers to examine the effect of industry
concentration on profits.
Profit and Concentration
The early empirical work testing the concentration-performance hypotheses was
mainly the work of Bain and his followers, Bain found that the average profit rate was
significantly larger in manufacturing industries with eight-firm concentration ratios (CR8)
of 70 or greater compared to industries with a CR8 below that level, Bain also found that
the concentration ratio is positively related to industry profitability. Since then there have
been hundreds of studies that have yielded similar conclusions (Scherer and Ross, 1990 p.
41 I). Pelzman was so impressed by the accumulated evidence that he concluded in 1977
that "Iw Jith few exceptions, market concentration and industry profitability are positively
correlated (Clarke, Davis, and Waterson, 1984)."
Recent studies have shown that these previous results may have been spurious.
This was caused by aggregating "a positive relationship between sellers' market shares
and profitability to the industry level." (Scherer and Ross, 1990 pAIl) Instead of
concentration leading to higher profits, it is the larger market share that affects profits.
To account for this, studies started to look at firms' market shares as a cause of positive
economic profits. This refinement was not possible earlier due the lack of detailed firm
data.
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Profit and Market Share
The availability of detailed business line data has enabled researchers to confirm
the importance of market share. The Federal Trade Commission's Line of Business
program is one example of a data set that provided disaggregated data at the business
level. Using this data set, studies have found that when holding market share constant,
concentration (CR4) , in general, does not have a positive effect on profits.
Concentration has even been found to have a negative effect on profitability when market
share was also included in the model (Ravenscraft, 1983).
Further evidence is found in Montgomery's study of product-market
diversification. Montgomery (J985) included several explanatory variables in her model,
including market share. concentration, and a returns-on-invested-capita) variable (a
measure of a finn's profitability). In criticizing the theory that diversified firms attain
higher profits, she provides results that support the market share argument of market
power. Specifically, market share had a significant and positive estimated coefficient,
whereas the estimated coefficient of CR4 was not significant. (Montgomery, 1985)
Because of the varied results found in studies of market share's effects on profit,
Szymanski, Bharadwa], and Yaradarajan (1993) performed a meta-analysis on over
seventy such studies. They found that, on average, market share is positively correlated
with business profitability. However they caution that the relationship is moderated by
specification errors, sample characteristics, and measurement characteristics.
Although market share appears positively correlated with profits, the magnitude
of the effect may be less than originally thought. It had been assumed that a one-percent
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change in market share led to a half-percent change in profits. However, changes in
profit may be closer to a one-tenth percent change for a one-percent change in market
share (Aaker and Jacobson, 1985). Further work is needed to reach general conclusions,
if any exist, regarding the actual magnitude of the relationship.
Profit, Concentration, and Market Share
It is possible that both concentration and market share can have a positive effect
on profits. While concentration increases the industry's price level, i.e., all firms receive
higher profits, high firm market share allows firms to receive higher individual profits.
Concentrated industries would have higher profit levels than non-concentrated industries,
and high market share firms would have higher profits than low market share firms.
This has been supported by several studies including Ravenscraft (1983). In the
Ravenscraft study, both market share ( which should capture the greater efficiency or
"luck" of leading firms) and industry concentration (a proxy for the potential to collude)
had a positive and significant effect on profits (Connor, et al., 1985). Many researchers
(for a review see Connor, et al.) combine measures of CR4 and market share to create a
relative firm market share variable. This variable captures both the contributions of CR4
and market share without the multi-collinearity problems of using the two correlated
measures.
Rents
Much of this work has been used to provide clues as to the existence and degree
of market power within an industry. Profit can increase, however, without price increases
caused by market power. The left-hand side of equation (5), (P-MC)/P, is made up of
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both price and marginal cost. It is possible that prices increase, which would support the
claims or market power, or that MC has decreased, suggesting an efficiency-based
argument. Efficiency arguments are based on the assumption that certain firms have
lower cuxts (due to size or a unique factor) than their rivals.
Positive profits are not necessarily due to market power. They can be caused by
economics of scale in the industry or by a unique input. These profits are sometimes
called rents. Rents are either Ricardian or monopolistic and are generated either by
efficiency or by supply restriction, respectively.
Economic profits that result from lower average total cost (ATC), which are not
the result of monopsony power, are known as Ricardian rents. The positive profit is a
reflection of the higher value of the low ATC firm's inputs. The unique input leads to
greater rclati ve efficiency for the firm possessing it.
For example, a particular farm may have exceptionally fertile land. This farm can
produce at a lower cost than other farms. Because the market price of an homogenous
industry is equal the cost of the marginal supplier (highest cost) the price of the
agricullural commodity will be above the fertile farm's cost. This gives the fertile farm
positive profits on the sale of its produce. The discounted flow of extra profit received
will equal the current stock value of the difference between the fertile plot of land and the
lower quality land; if not, the fertile land will be sold to invest the price premium
elsewhere. The Ricardian rent will therefore equal the opportunity cost of holding on to
the scarce input.
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[I' the unique input is such that it prevents others from entering the market, then
the market is a natural monopoly. For example, assume that there is a single mine for a
particular ore. The mine would be able to completely control market supply because
entry of new suppliers is impossible. The flow of profit received from the mine over
time, while still equal to its stock value, is based on supply restriction, not to efficiency.
Imperfect competition can also result from economies of scale. Economy of scale
(EOS) simply means that as all elements of production are increased by some factor,
output will increase by some larger factor. A good example is the auto industry. Because
there are such high fixed costs to produce, auto firms are more efficient with greater size.
The industry becomes concentrated as the larger firms, with low ATC, price the smaller
competitors out of the market.
Therc is much debate in the literature if industries characterized by economies of
scale receive Ricardian rents or monopoly rents. Of course, monopoly rents associated
with industries with EOS would not be an issue if firms could enter freely as assumed by
the basic neoclassical model.
This assumption of the neoclassical model of free entry is questionable
considering the above discussion of the auto industry. Without entry, or the threat of hit-
and-run entry of a contestable market, the corrective effect of entering firms on price is
prevented. [f entry barriers are coupled with concentrated industries (few firms), the
potential for market failure is high.
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Concentration of an industry could come about through competition if there is a
cost advantage due to scale economies or through shifts in positively sloped marginal cost
curves (Demsctz, 1972). The Differential Efficiency Hypotheses (DEH) states that:
"Effective Collusion is rare or nonexistent. In some industries, long-lived
efficiency differences are unimportant, and both concentration and
accounting profitability are generally low. Where efficiency differences
are important, efficient firms obtain large market shares and earn rents,
and both concentration and industry-level profitability are thus high
(Schrnalcnsce, 1987)."
Dernserz bclicvc-, that some industries are concentrated because large firms are more
efficient. From this argument, concentration and profitability are correlated, but it is from
efficiency, and not from collusion. However, "evidence ... is more sympathetic to the
traditional market power explanation of profitability-concentration correlation at the
industry level than it is to DEH" (Clarke, Davies, and Waterson, 1984).
Dcmscrz does, however, put into question the nature of profit studies. Not all
oligopoly theory points to increased profit with higher industry concentration. Both
Bertrand and Chamberlin's theories do not predict higher profits. While Bertrand does
not predict higher prices, Chamberlin's large numbers case predicts that in oligopoly
profits will disappear while high prices remain. There is also the possibility of X-
inefficiencies eating away at excess profits in oligopolistic markets (Weiss, 1989). This
ambiguity in theory makes it difficult to formulate empirical tests of market structure-
profit relationships.
Another problem with profit studies is difficulty in measurement. Frequently,
well-defined economic concepts are very difficult to measure empirically. The literature
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is filled with various studies testing profit determinants without a common measure.
Weiss (1989) outlines a host of measurement biases that occur within these studies. An
approach that circumvents some of these problems is the price-market structure model.
This literature is reviewed in the next section.
Price and Market Structure
Price-market structure models provide a more direct means to study the market
power question (Connor, et aI., 1985). By using a price model, the criticisms of Demsetz
can be circumvented; the effect of concentration and market share on price can be
associated with market power instead of greater efficiency. Note that high prices may be
a goal, but that they should not remain after "the adjustment is complete in competition."
(Weiss, 1989) In the long run, entry by new firms will drive price back toward minimum
ATC
In practice, it is very difficult to ascertain marginal costs. This is due in part to
firms' reluctance in reporting sensitive cost data. To avoid the problem of missing cost
data, a proxy for MC is often used instead. For many products sold in large
supermarkets, there are both branded products and the retail store's version of the product
called a private label. Private labels' prices are assumed to approximate the competitive
price and therefore marginal cost for all firms (Connor and Peterson, J 992). Where
private labels exist they are used as the proxy for MC
There are three basic types of price-market structure studies. The first is the
Price-Concentration model that models price as a function of industry concentration. The
second is the Price-Market Share model where increased market share is postulated to
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raise price. The third type is a combination of the first two. with price as a function of
both industry concentration and market share.
Price and Concentration
Many models have been designed 10 test the effects of industry conccntr.uion on
price. These models are similar to the profit-concentration studies but instead usc price
as the dependent variable instead of profit. Price models also diller in Ihal they tend 10
look at singlc industries with virtually homogeneous products. to avoid incompuruhlc
marker prices (Weiss, 1989).
In a study of local cement markets, Koller and Weiss rested ihc basic hypothcsis
that seller concentration is positively correlated with price levels. They found thai
concentration was statistically significant for each of the seven years of dala. In all but
two of the years there was a positive relationship between concentration and price (Weiss.
1989).
In another study by Parker and Connor. narioual-brund and private-label rct.ul
price differences were regressed against CR4. CR4'. two advertising variables. and five
control variables. Their results yielded statistically significant rcxultx for all structural
variables, with a positive regression coefficient for the concentration variable (Connor. ~
al., 1985).
To avoid the problems of price comparisons over distinct markets. Kelton and
Weiss developed a simultaneous equations model to test the relationship between change
in concentration and change in price. By examining changes in price and concentration
they could present more general results. They concluded thai "rising concentration doc.,
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lead to long term price changes." They note that the relationship is stronger for consumer
goods than capital goods (Weiss, 1989).
Differentiation and Branding
Fln11Sare able to charge different prices for goods if the products are in some way
different from other products in the industry. When an industry is made up of
functionally similar but slightly different products it is said to be differentiated. These
distinctions are based on either real or perceived quality differences and image of the
brands.
Finns try to differentiate themselves from their competitors through branding. A
branded product is endowed with physical and implied attributes, often created and
maintained by advertising. These attributes are both functional evaluations and emotional
connections.
Marketing is used to bond the consumers with a particular brand. Marketers
aucmpt to convince the consumer that the brand is functionally superior and/or socially
superior to other brands in the industry. Brand loyalty develops as the consumer begins
identifying with the brand. Firms attempt to identify their brand with certain
characteristics that appeal to the consumer. Those skeptical of price effects due to brand
image need only look at the prices of bottled water to be convinced. It is not uncommon
for some branded water to sell at twice the price of the lowest priced competitor.
Conspicuous consumers are not the only ones influenced by branding. For
example, Jell-O brand gelatin is chemically identical to other gelatins yet sells at a
substantially higher price over its nearest rival, Royal gelatin. Jell-O sells its gelatin with
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all of the implied attributes of the Jell-O brand: wholesomeness, family fun, and the
actor/comedian Bill Cosby as their spokesperson.
It is essential that the brand name be distinguished from the product. The product
IS the physical good (gelatin, water, margarine) and the brand is a conceptual set of
attributes. Successful brands (Jell-O or Parkay) rarely have any product reference in their
names, which allows for expansion or movement of the brand into other industries.
Regardless of how the product is differentiated the effects are higher prices.
Higher prices are maintained because product differentiation serves as a type of "micro"
barrier to entry. For example, the more consumers who view Coke and Pepsi as different
products (low substitutes), the higher these firms can raise their own cola prices.
Price and Market Share
The price-market share model attempts to account for the effects of product
differentiation on prices by allowing multiple prices to exist within an industry. In most
concentration models a single price is used for the entire market and necessitate many
local markets to create a cross-sectional dataset - rarely are goods sold at one price in
multi-finn markets. Models that incorporate the effects of market share in differentiated
industries avoid averaging out the effects of market share on price.
Most of the price studies by Weiss, unfortunately, have not included market share
as an independent variable. However, a paper by Wills did study the effects of market
share on price. In his study of food markets, Wills looked at "the prices of individual
brands, private labels, and generic labels for 145 very specific categories ... "This
approach removed many of the price differences due to unequal quality levels. The results
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of the study showed that national market share was positively related to brand retail price
(Connor et aI., 1985). Many price-market share studies, such as Wills, have come under
fire for not having an explicit theoretical base for the empirical models. Tbis has lead to
criticism thai the work has been "data mined" for results or that results represent
correlations rather than causation.
To counter the opponents of this work, Haller (1994) laid out in detail a
theoretically derived model of differentiated products. The derivation starts with the
profit maximization problem of firm i where
(9) n, = (p, - AVC,)-q, - FC,
is the finn's profit function where:
11:, = firm i\ profit
p, = finn i's price
AVC, = average variable cost for firm i
q, = finn i's quantity
FC', = fixed cost for firm i.
Through manipulation of the first order conditions, Haller arrives at a functional form of
firm i's price determined by cost, elasticity of demand, and market share. In the simple
Bertrand (zero-conjectures) case the above relationship reduces to
( 10) [1]} - MeI, - I 1-s
l
/'7/11
where:
p, = firm i's price
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Mel := firm i's marginal cost
Sj:= firm i's market share
11'''=market price elasticity of demand.
Haller points out that even if all firms have identical marginal costs, prices can
still vary due to differences in market share. This is in direct opposition to the Demsetz
differential efficiency view. Demsetz argues that all price differences are due to COSI
differentials between firms. Haller's work shows that this explanation of differing prices
overlooks the effects of market share on price.
Haller tested his theory of market power with empirical models using cottage
cheese and catsup sales data from sixty-five retail markets in the U.S .. Average price per
pound was regressed against several independent variables, including volume market
share. There was clear evidence of a positive relationship between market share and
puce. This relationship, however, "is an inter-brand rather than an intra-brand
relationship." The brands with higher market shares had higher prices but to increase
share firms needed to lower price.
The above relationship was tested with investor owned firms (lOF) and
agricultural cooperatives. Haller compared the results of the catsup industry where no
significant cooperatives operate with the cottage cheese industry, with many significant
cooperatives to test for differences between cooperatives and IOFs. He found that
cooperatives differ from their IOF counterparts.
In the cottage cheese industry, brands marketed by cooperatives do have the
positive market share-price relationship Haller noted above. They do not, however, have
as strong a relationship as the IOFs. The relationship was one third to one half that of
brands not marketed by cooperatives. Even more significantly is that cooperatives seem
to affect prices of all brands. "Brands sold in markets where co-ops compete sell for
three to eight cents less than they would were the co-ops not there." From rhis Haller
concludes that "cooperatives should be encouraged to enter or expand their presence in
branded products markets."
In another study of cooperatives, Andonov (1996) estimated a price model, similar
to Haller's, for the margarine industry. This industry was selected due to its high degree
of physical product homogeneity, which served to reduce the degree of quality differences
among brands. The data set consisted of quarterly, retail margarine price data from 1992.
There were over six thousand observations gathered from about sixty retail markets
across the United States.
Private-label price was included in the model to control for varying costs by
gcographical retail markets (Andonov, 1996). Connor and Peterson (1992) have argued
that if private-label firms operate in a market then their prices should be a good proxy for
the competitive price (and hence MC) in the industry since the private-label segment has
minimal barriers to entry. Therefore, private-label price is used to control for price
differences related to different costs in these geographic markets. For each of the
approximately sixty retail markets used there is only an average price for all private-labels
in each regional market - this variable is meant to capture general cost differences among
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the retail markets. For example, many large cities have high labor costs that put upward
pressure on all the products sold in the market, including margarine.
Andonov'< results were strikingly different from Haller's. Andonov did not find a
significant effect of cooperatives on the market price levels, and he failed to find the
positive price share relationship found in Haller's work. Market share had an estimated
regression coefficient of -.11, and was highly significant. Andonov's result seems to
support the differential efficiency hypothesis that larger-share finns are lower-cost
producers with lower prices, however, once advertising expenditures were accounted for
leading brands with the highest advertising had the highest prices and increased as either
their market share or advertising increased.
Advertising
As stated earlier, firms will try to differentiate their product from rivals. This
non-price competition is achieved hy slight alterations of the product and/or heavy
advertising. It is difficult to distinguish between the price effects of superior quality and
the perceived quality differences caused by advertising. Advertising serves both to
educate the consumer about actual product attributes and to influence consumers'
perceptions.
Wills' (1983 a) study of fifty processed foods attempted the difficult task of
separating these two effects. Wills used Consumer Reports for quality evaluations to
compare quality differences among the products. By holding quality constant, he
concluded that brand prices were a positive function of advertising. His results would
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suggest that advertising does affect consumers' beliefs regarding product quality (Connor
etal.,1985).
Advertising expenditures should be included in most models of market
performance for branded products. However, an econometric problem may arise when
advertising is included in models along with market share, at least in consumer markets.
The results of many studies show that advertising is significantly related with profit in
consumer markets. Jacobson and Aaker (1985) also show that market share is related to
advertising. This suggests the possibility of collinearity in models where both market
share and advertising serve as explanatory variables for profit, and by similar reasoning,
for price.
Price, Market Share, and Concentration
As with the profit models, both concentration and market share may have a
positive effect on prices. Concentrated industries are expected to have higher price levels
than non-concentrated industries. Accordingly, high market-share firms are hypothesized
to have higher prices than low market share firms.
In one such study, Marion et al. examined price levels by retail grocery stores for
a market basket of 94 comparable products across varying retail market structures.
Measures for retail concentration and market share or relative market share (RMS) was
used. RMS was derived by dividing CR4 by a firm's market share. The market basket
price was regressed on these variables along with several other explanatory variables.
The authors found that the estimated coefficients for concentration and for both market
share measures were positive and statistically significant (Weiss, 1989).
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In a similar study, Cotterill performed a price analysis of the same 94 products in
the Marion report and added frozen, dairy and health products (Weiss, 1989). While the
basic structure of the study was the same, most of the explanatory variables were
different. Included was a measure for concentration and a measure for either market
share or RMS. Cotterill ran two regressions with both concentration and RMS, with
concentration measured by CR2 or CR 1. These concentration ratios based on either the
leading firm or top two firms were used because the markets being studied were much
smaller than the markets in the Marion study. The first regression used CR2 as the
measure for concentration, and yielded statistically significant positive estimates for the
two coefficients. The second estimate equation used CR I, and only concentration was
significant - not surprising given that CRI is the leader's market share.
The above studies provide evidence, albeit tenuous, to support that price is a
positive function of market concentration, market share, and advertising levels. The
notion warrants further research beyond that done on the more conventional structure-
conduct-performance relationships,
Market Share and Price
Most of the studies that look at market-share price relationships make an implicit
assumption about the causal flow. SpecificaJIy, they assume that price is a positive
function of market share. However, market share can be written as a function of price, by
reversing the causality relationship.
The study by Aaker and Jacobson is one of the few traditional 10 studies that
looked at market share as the dependent variable. The study separated the data into four
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categories: All Business, Consumer Goods, Capital Goods, and Supply Goods. Market
share was written as a function of several variables, including two lagged measures of
market share and a measure of relative price. Relative price was statistically significant
for all categories except Capital Goods. In all of the significant cases, relative price was
negatively correlated with market share. This would suggest that higher relative prices
lead to lower market share (Aaker and Jacobson, 1985). New empirical industrial
organization (NEIO) studies also use share as the dependent variable. The NErO argues
that the key to understanding market power is in the demand structure that each firm faces
when selling its products.
New Empirical Industrial Organization
In 1982 Appelbaum laid the foundation for the NErO by outlining a procedure
that used a system of equations to estimate market structure. Specifically, Appelbaum
provided a structure to estimate directly the conjectural variation (A) so that price-cost
margins could be estimated. Unfortunately this approach assumes constant marginal cost
across Industries and hence is unable to answer the efficiency argument.
Baker and Bresnahan (1985), while following Appelbaum's demand analysis
approach to market power, introduced competitive analysis based on the residual demand
curves associated with a given firm. Cotterill (1993 p.1 I) states:
'The residual demand and the market structure-price approach avoid the
cost efficiency critique when testing for market power. Residual demand
analysts estimate the residual demand curves for an individual product
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(business unit) and discover whether the residual demand cure has nonzero
(negative) slope."
A negative slope or the residual demand curve indicates market power.
The analysis applied the residual demand method to the beer industry where
residual demand elasticities for beer products sold by Anheuser-bush, Coors, and Miller
were estimated. By simulating mergers, Baker and Baresnahan tested the assumption that
there would be an increase of market power. This was done by estimating both own price
and cross price elasticities of demand from the residual demand curves. By making
limiting assumptions about supply they could estimate residual demand elasticities and
show the increase of market power based on simulated mergers between the above firms.
The measure of market power used was the observed price elasticity of demand - a
function of demand elasticity (own and cross) and price reaction elasticities, the percent
changc in price by a firm given a price change of a rival. The general form of the
observed elasticity is given as:
( I I)
N
1)'/ = /7/1 + L 1)/, E"
2=1
where:
11'" = the residual price elasticity of demand
1111 = the non-fellowship or unilateral price elasticity of demand
11I; = the cross-price elasticity of demand
CjJ = the price response elasticity of rival i.
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The residual demand elasticity is estimated directly from the residual demand curve. This
estimate is inverted and is equated to the price markup; this holds exactly when the firms
are in a constant conjecture equilibrium. (Baker and Baresnahan, 1985)
Hausman et al. present a less limiting approach to demand estimation in their
I ')')4 paper by estimating the own and cross price elasticities. The beer industry is again
analyzed, this time using a multistage budgeting model to estimate the demand
clasticiucs. The elasticities are then used in a competitive analysis of the beer industry to
simulate the market power effects of mergers between brands.
To generate the elasticities Hausman first set up a three-tier demand system. The
top tier corresponds to the total demand for the product (beer). The middle level estimates
the demand for beer in each segment of the industry; the industry is broken into light,
popular, and premium beers. At the bottom level are the demand equations for brands
within each segment.
Once these elasticities are estimated it is possible to forecast the change in price of
a given brand after a merger. The form derived is
( 12)
I
- I
where:
(X, = the percentage price increase of each merging product
E,i = the own-price elasticity of demand for brand j
e/," = the post-merger markup
3X
The authors "calculate a hypothetical merger between two brands in the premium
segment, Coors and Labatts. . ,. from the above equation. They find that the increase in
price following a merger between the two brands depends on the constraining effects of
other brands in the industry. The simulation yielded a wide range of price increases
ranging from 4.4% to 108.3% for Coors and 3.3% to 104.8% for Labatts (costs were held
constant).
Adding to Hausman et aI., Cotterill (1994) attempts to unveil the price change of
a particular brand given the change in a rival's price. A system of demand equations is
estimated with price reaction functions to uncover both the elasticities of demand and
price reaction elasticities.
To derive the price reaction function, Cotterill substitutes an empirical demand
equation into the firm's profit equation for q,; the reaction function can be uncovered by
differentiating the profit equation with respect to the firm's price and then solving for
price. Cotterill has shown that this approach will yield estimates for price reaction
functions that can be used in estimating the observed demand elasticities in Baker and
Baresnahan.
While Cotterill's approach to estimating the price reaction elasticities leads to
unrestricted estimates, the functional form of the price reaction function is difficult to
derive. The revenue portion of the profit equation used to generate the reaction functions
is easily defined but the cost portion is not. This makes it difficult to solve for price in
terms of only the parameters of the model and rivals' prices.
Another elasticity paper by Haung and Hahn estimates meat elasticities for several
agricultural segments. An interesting feature of this paper is the functional forms used to
estimate the elasticities - a first order differential demand function. This same functional
form is used in this thesis to estimate margarine elasticities. The next chapter outlines the
Haung and Hahn model and the two-stage budgeting frame work used in this paper.
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CHAPTER III
DEMAND THEORY
In a study of price elasticities of demand, Huang and Hahn (J 994) use a first order
differential approximation of the general Marshallian demand curves for meat. The
derivation of the differential demand model is completely general and imposes no
restrictions on the demand structure. In the following section we will see that certain
restrictions should be imposed to aggregate across commodities and consumers. The
model is then re-derived considering these restrictions.
The following COmes almost exclusively from Huang and Hahn (1994). The
Marshallian demand curve is derived from the constrained maximization problem facing
the individual consumer. The consumer's utility function is maximized subject to a linear
budget constraint5.
More formally:
( I 3) max L = U( q) - 11.( p « q - M )
'f, A
where:
Urq) = the utility function
A = the Lagrangian multiplier (marginal utility of income)
p = an n-coordinate row vector of prices
q = an n-coordinare coJumn vector of quantities
M = consumer expenditure (inner product of p and q)
"The budget constraint need not be linear. See Deaton and Muellbauer 1980.
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Differentiating the above yields
(14) U, ( '1) = /l, e 1', ' V i = 1, 2, ." n
and
(15) peq=M.
Solving these equations simultaneously gives
( 16) '1, = g, (I', M), Vi = 1,2, ... ,n
which is the ordinary demand system in its most general form.
The first order differential approximation imposes no explicit structure on the
conceptual demand equation. Taking the total derivative of the general demand function
yields
(17 )
"This demand system is quite general in relating ... small changes from any given point
on the n-cornrnodity surface." (Huang and Hahn, 1994)
It is a simple matter to rewrite (17) in terms of elasticities. Multiplying the first
and second terms of the right-hand side of (17) by P, /p, and M/M respectively, yields
( 18)
dq, M
--dM
dMM
which is then divided by q, to obtain
( 19)
dq,
'1,
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where the terms in parenthesis are the price and income elasticities, respectively. This
can be rewritten as
'I,
d I'__ I +
I' ,
[ , j I , 2, ,11(20)
dq,
where E" equals the price elasticity of demand (own and cross price) and 11,equals the
income elasticity of demand for good i.
There are several constraints that Huang and Hahn impose on (20) to insure
consistency with classical demand theory of the consumer. These are as follows:
Engel Aggregation: L, w, 11;= 1
Homogeneity :1, E" + 11,= 0
Symmetry: E,/W, + 11,= Ej,iw, + 11.i
Negativity: £1\ + wIllI < 0
where w, is the budget share of the ith good. The budget share is the proportion of total
expenditure for good i, (p, -q,)/M. The next section explores when it is appropriate to
model market demand in this fashion. Based on this discussion the correct structure of
the price elasticirv for the differential model will be derived.
Separability and Two-Stage Budgeting
As discussed at the close of the previous chapter, Huang and Hahn (1994) present
a very useful model, although it is not appropriate in all situations. This section outlines
the utility structure that allows for the correct application of the differential demand
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model. The following section will derive the general form of the price and income
elasticities for the appropriate utility structure.
The advantage of the two-stage budgeting approach is that it significantly reduces
the number of parameters that need to be estimated. Instead of modeling demand as a
function 01 price" from all products in the economy, the researcher can eliminate all but
the most relevant brands or markets from estimation. Demand at each level is conditional
on the allocated expenditure for that level. This eliminates unlikely brand level consumer
comparisons, e.g .. deciding between a Magnavox television and a Snapple iced tea.
The general demand function specifies the demand of any single good as a
function of the prices of all goods available (now and in the future). Accounting for the
prices of all goods, however, both present and inter-temporally, is impossible.
Fortunately, it is possible to model demand as a series of partial maximization problems.
For example. the demand for "food" can be found without knowing the distribution of
individual food products. (Varian, 1992 1'.147)
Consider the case where there are two "subbundles,l, so that the consumption
bundle is (x, z) and the price vector is (I', g). The consumer's maximization problem can
be rewritten as
(21 ) max U(X. z) such that PX + q:
x :
In
'term from Varian, 1992.
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where P and X are indexes that are functions of individual prices and quantities, such
that:
P = I' (p) and X = I' (x).
These indexes are some average price and quantity for the aggregate commodity bundle.
Aggregation of this type is possible only if there is either Hicksian or functional
l '1' 7separa)l uy .
Functional separability indicates that there is separability of preferences such that
"commodities can be partitioned into groups so that preferences within groups can be
described independently of the quantities of other groups." (Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980) This is equivalent to saying that there is a subutility function for each commodity
group and that total utility is a combination of the subutilities. "[T[he utility function can
he written as
(22)
where f (0) is some increasing function and Vf, v; and Vo are the subutility functions
associated with food, shelter, and entertainment, respectively." (Deaton and Muellbauer,
1980) It is possible that each subutility function is itself comprised of further subutility
functions. The utility tree in Figure 2 shows the hierarchical nature of nested subutility
functions.
"Only functional separability will he addressed.
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Figure 2
Utility Tree: Commodity Groups and Separability
----I Cereal
Food
Vegerables
-----1 Housing
Shelter
Fuel
Theater
Entertainment I------j
'------\ Music
Two-stage budgeting can be seen as a natural extension of the utility tree. Total
expenditure is first allocated across the aggrcgate groups (food, shelter, and
entertainment). Then the consumer maximizes the subutility function for each specific
good conditioned on group expenditure. "In order to have a budget constraint that is
linear in quantity index, we need to assume ... the subutility function is homothetic."
(Varian, 1992 p.ISI)
The intuition behind a multi-stage budget demand system is that consumers make
purchasing decisions hierarchically. Purchasing decisions are first made at the industry
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level. Once the industry is selected, the consumer then selects the appropriate market
segment from which to purchase. Finally the consumer chooses the brand from the
remaining brands. Consider an example of an automobile purchase. The consumer first
decides to buy a car (industry), then decides the type (market segment) and then chooses
which car to buy from that segment (brand). "Note that two-stage budgeting involves
both aggregation (to construct the broad groups) and separable decision making (for each
of the group sub-problems)." (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980)
While related, separability does not imply two-stage budgeting. The first stage
needs stronger conditions than weak separability for an exact solution8 Separability is,
however, necessary and sufficient for the second stage of two-stage budgeting. (Deaton
and Muellbauer, 1980)
Aggregation Across Consumers
When modeling market demand, it is tempting to treat aggregate behavior as an
inclividualutility maximization problem. Unfortunately, this is appropriate only in very
specific situations. Aggregate demand will hold "no interesting properties other than
homogeneity and continuity." Hence "the theory of the consumer places no restrictions on
aggregate behavior. ... " (Varian, J 992 p.IS3)
It is possible, however, to model aggregate behavior as if it were generated by a
representative consumer. Market demand will appear to be generated by utility
maximization if all individuals are assumed to have an indirect utility function with the
"See Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980.
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Gorrnon form:
(23) V,(/),III,) = ",(1') + h(p)m,
Notice Iha' the b (p) term is independent of i and is therefore identical for all consumers.
When income enters the utility function linearly as above, the marginal propensity to
spend is identical for all consumers. The demand function derived from the Gorman
utility function clearly shows this result.
Using Roy's identity we find that the demand function for good j for individual i is
(24 ) '1,'(1',111,) = al ip) + fJl(p)l11i
where:
a/(p) =
d a;(p)
dp
I
hlp)
and
fJl (1') =
diJ(pj
dp
I
hlp)
Differentiating q,' with respect to m, yields b', which is independent of i. From this we
can conclude that the marginal propensity to spend is "independent of the level of income
of any consumer and also constant across consumers since b (p) is constant across
consumers." (Varian, 1992 p. 153)
The aggregate demand function can be found by summing the above demand
function across all consumers so that
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Q'II'.m', ...ni") =
aalp)
a 1',
hlp)
ab(p)
ap
I,JI+ --£"',_/,n,
hip} -(25) ""£"',=1
The associated indirect utility function of Q' can be shown to be
(26) VII'.M) = I;=,a,(p) + h(p)M = A(p) + B(p)M,
where Lm, = M (Varian, 1992 p.IS3).
The Gormon form can be shown to be both sufficient and necessary for the
representative consumer model to be valid. Considering this, We must revisit the Haung
and Hahn model to determine when it is consistent with the Gorman form,
Huang and Hahn report that their first order differential approximation of demand
is derived from a demand curve with an unknown utility structure. However, Huang and
Hahn are modeling market demand with theoretical restrictions, implying that the demand
function is derivable from a utility function. Following from the above discussion, the
use of restrictions in an aggregate demand model requires the use of the Gorman form.
By substituting the Gorman indirect utility function for the general function used by
Huang and Hahn we can determine what the structure of the differential model must be to
impose restrictions on market demand.
Rewriting the representative consumer model
(27)
aa,(p)
---
aI',
MI' )
ah(1' )
ap ,
Mp) m,
+ -
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Then taking the total derivative as indicated by Huang and Hahn
if (/!.J'l
JI',,)j',
hll' J
and rewriting to gel
d q/
we see that
and
a' ([,(1')-----
a",ap,
[
JOdP} db(p) 1 ]-- + --111/
aI', o», ah(I'J I
+ 2 " -- CPA
b(pt o», ldb(I'} 1dl'+ --I dM17(1' )
dM
ab(p)
a P,
hlp)hlp)
ab(p)
a p,
)--
b(p)
dp, +
I a'a,lp} + a' btp} ab(p)l11raq,' apia", a",a", + 2( 'I,' ) ~=
() 1', l b(p) hIP)
()h( p)
() " I
b(p)
The marginal propensity to spend is clearly independent of i in the above partial
derivativc. These derivatives show that the differential demand structure is consistent
with utility theory if all individuals are assumed to have a utility structure of the Gorman
form.
50
Much of the empirical work in this paper blends the procedures outlined by
Hausman et 'II. (1994) and Huang and Hahn, (1994). A two-stage budget model is used
to estimate elasncitie« 'II each level within the model. The functional forms for the
demand equations at each level are first order differentials of general demand functions.
The coefficients of the demand functions at each level are conditional elasticities -
conditioned on the expenditure allocated to that level. While not calculated here, it is
possiblc to combine the elasticities at each level to construct unconditional elasticities"'
'Hausman et. al (1994) calculate the unconditional elasticities from the conditional
elasticities estimated with an AIDS model.
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CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL MODEL
In the last chapter a theoretical model for a demand model in elasticity form was
laid out. This chapter will present the empirical form of these equations used in the
estimation procedure. The demand system for each stage will be presented, followed by a
description of the variables and their data sources.
Each stage ,,1' the model, except for the industry, is conditional on consumer
expenditures on the next highest level. In this study the brand level demand system is
conditional on segment level expenditures. In turn, the demand at the segment level is
conditional on total expenditures for the industry. Therefore, both brand and segment
demand elasticities are conditional; the demand is conditioned on a fixed level of
expenditure. It is only after industry demand is estimated that the lower level elasticities
can he transformed into unconditional elasticities.
The empirical functional forms for the demand equations for all three levels are
based on the first order linear approximations of Huang and Hang. While all of the
demand equations are based on the same theoretical model, they do differ between the
levels. The differences will be explicitly noted after each has been presented.
The brand level equations are the first stage. Here demand is seperated into
regular margarines and spreads. This separation was based on a study by Consumer
Reports that divided the margarine industry into distinct market segments based on the
ingredients.
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Demand for a brand is written in terms of prices and expenditures for that
segment only. No cross-segment price or other decision variable effects are included at
the brand level
The demand equations can be written in the general form:
(28)
Y,IIII == PrO + !3ifExP"lIll + E,1Pim!+ e., P/I11/+ p,ITim,e +
Pi:? MOr /Pi I + /3'3 Mb, ",, + /314 Advert, r + 1315 Adriv, f +
fJ,c,Unll!IlI + Yr,DJ + Y,lD2 + ... + Y,.'8D.I,,'
where
= change in total expenditure for the segment (either regular or spread)for
segment a, in market m, at time t
:;:change in own price in market m, at time t
== change in rivals' price in market 111, at time t
Ti me = quarterly time trend
= change in the percent of volume sold under featured ads for brand i in
market m, at time t
= change in the percent of volume sold while on display for brand i in
market 111, at time t
= change in advertising expenditures for brand i, at time t
Adriv., = change in the sum of brand i's rivals' advertising at time t
Untlillt = change in the uni ts per pound for brand i in market rn, at time t
D, , "', D" = dummy variables for 38 different regional markets.
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The next set of equations represent the empirical equations for the market
segments. The form of the demand equations at the segment level is almost identical with
the brand level. There are some differences that should be noted. The marketing
variables, advertising intensity variable. and the units per pound variable (Un~",,) have
been removed since at this level of aggregation these variables would be inappropriate.
The subscript 'a' distinguishes the two segments:
(29)
Yu III I = 1.jI(/() + If/utExp/ + cpo/Pllm! + <Ph2PhlJll + If/IIJAdregJlJ/ +
lJIu4Ad.\pdllll + \fJ(l5Time + wulDI + OJalD2 + ... + OJII3"D.i8
where
= change in the quantity sold in segment a, in market m, at time t
Exp, = change in industry level margarine expenditure in market rn, at time t
= change in the weighted average price for segment a, in market m, at
time t
= change in the weighted average price for segment b, in market m, at
time t
Adreg = change in the sum of advertising expenditures in the regular margarine
segment at time t
Adspd = change in the sum of advertising expenditures for the spread margarine
segment at time t
Time = a time trend
= dummy variables for 38 different regional markets used in estimation
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The final stage is the Industry level. This equation will be used to estimate the
industry level demand for margarine. It is
(30) YJNn =: YI! + Y I Prllli + Y! P1JIIJ + Y ...Pop + V.; Inc
where
Y",,, = change in total quantity of margarine sold
Pllld ::; change in aggregate price for margarine
f\lIl = change in aggregate price for butter
Pop = change in domestic population
Inc = change in per-capita income
At the industry level demand is not conditioned on a fixed level of expenditure. Instead
demand is written as a function of income.
Estimation Method
The two brand level demand systems and the segment demand system were
estimated using restricted iterative seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). The SUR
method was used to take into account any possible cross-equation correlation of the error
terms. SUR improves efficiency over ordinary least squares (OLS) if the independent
variables differ across equations and there is contemporaneous correlation of errors across
equations.
Improvement in efficiency using SUR is a large sample property. In order to
realize efficiency gains there must be a "reasonable amount of data .... " (SAS/ETS
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User's Guide, p. 555). The 524 observations of margarine data should be enough to
reduce the sampling variability of the estimator - allowing for efficient SUR estimation.
The SUR estimates were constrained by three demand restrictions: symmetry,
Engle aggregation, and homogeneity. Both Engle aggregation and symmetry are system
constraints that impose restrictions across equations. The homogeneity restriction
constrains the relationship of estimates within each equation. The actual restrictions used
can be found in the appendix.
Variables and Data
The scanner data are from the InfoScan data base purchased from Information
Resources, Inc. (IRI). lRI acquires supermarket scanner data from several retail markets
across the country. These data are assembled to calculate quantity, price, demographic,
and marketing variables for every brand sold. Additional data were taken from the
Leading National Advertisers (LNA) reports. LNA collects brand level advertising
expenditure data on the advertisers in each industry.
Most of the data for the brand and segment stages comes from the IRI data set; the
segment data are an aggregation of the brand level data. Not all of the margarine data
from the IRI data set is used in the final database. The following are the reasons for
taking only part of the available data.
To maintain a balanced panel data set every brand analyzed had to be in every
market in every period. Frequently, a brand was in many markets but not in all time
periods (the brand entered or exited the market). Conversely a brand might be in all (or
most) periods but be absent in some markets. The number of markets in the available
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data set ranged from 3R in 1988 to 65 in 1992 and included a maximum of 150 brands. A
tradeoff between markets versus periods had to be made. The final data set consists of 39
regional retail markets spanning all four quarters in the years 1989 to 1992, all brands
from each segment present in every market and in every quarter. Five brands were in the
regular segment and seven brands were in the spread segment. This final data set
comprised over 60 percent of total margarine sales. While some regional economic
effects may be lost, it is hoped that the results will provide excellent estimates for these
national brands.
An additional 6th brand in the regular segment and 8th brand in the spread
segment were private-label composites. These composites were created by splitting total
private-label retail volume into the two segments in a two to one ratio of regular
margarine to spreads. This division was based on past research and trade information. A
drawback of this approach is that "brand" level prices for private-label composites are the
same for both segmcnts. but given that IRI averages private-label data by market, price
differences across segments are impossible to discern.
Data for the industry demand equation were taken from two sources. The data on
income and population were found in the Statistical Abstract of the United States. The
butter and margarine prices and margarine quantity data are from Bureau of Labor
Statistics publications. The industry level data are not disaggregated over regional
markets as are the brand and segment data sets.
In following Huang and Hahn's specification it was necessary to transform many
variables before they could be used in an estimation procedure. Much of the data is
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transformed into the relative changes over time. For example Y;, '" at time t is defined to
be (Y;, '" -Y; ,_,'" j/Yi ,_,m- This procedure makes our data consistent with the first-order
differential functional form. One quarter of data is lost due to the first differencing of the
variables. This brings the number of quarters in the data set down to 15 from 16. It wi11
be explicitly noted which variables have not been so transformed and why they were not.
Quantity
The dependent variable used for demand is the relative change in volume
(pounds) sold. The quantity of the product sold at a given price equals the amount
consumers are willing and able to buy at that price. The brand level data were taken from
the IRI data set, except for the media advertising data taken from LNA. For the segment
level, brand level volumes in each segment were added together by market to yield an
aggregate value for quantity, Ii (Y;, ",). To differentiate segment quantity for each
segment the subscript a is used where a = 1 for the regular segment and 2 for the spread
segment. The quantity at the industry level was derived by summing both over segments
and markets, Ia I", Ii (Y;, '" l".
Expenditure
Demand theory clearly dictates that there be some expenditure or income variable
included in demand estimation. From theory it is expected that expenditure (income) wi11
have a positive effect 011 demand; this positive relationship will not hold, however, if the
product is an inferior good.
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At the brand level the expenditure variable is created by summing brand prices
multiplied by brand volume. More formally Li (P; rIttxY" Itt) = Exp, I Itt , where i , a, t, and
m are index variables for brand, segment, time, and location, respectively. To account for
inflation the expenditure variables are divided by a regional consumer price index (CP~",)
all price and expenditure data must first be divided by the appropriate CPI to control for
inflation. Once the segment expenditures have been calculated it is possible to find the
industry expenditure. Industry expenditure is calculated as L" Expo, Itt = Exp, Itt , where
EXPrItt is the industry expenditure in each regional market at time t. Note that we do not
have to divide the industry measure by the CPI because the data have been converted into
real expenditures at the segment level.
The industry stage is not conditional on a set expenditure, instead per-capita
income is used in place of an expenditure measure. These data were already in real terms
when they were collected. The source for the income data is the Statistical Abstract Of
the United States.
As with expenditure, demand is explicitly derived as a function of price. Theory
also predicts that own-price will be negatively related to quantity demanded while rivals'
prices may have either a negative or positive effect; it will be positive if it is a substitute,
negative if a complement. For margarine, the cross-price elasticities (coefficients on
rivals prices) are expected to be positive; i.e., they are substitute goods.
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The price data used at the brand level are the average price for the branded
product in each of the 39 markets. This price is the average price facing the consumer
"net of all discounts except manufactures' coupons .... " (Haller, 1994) The average price
for each segment was calculated by dividing expenditures by total volume. Specifically
Exp., m/ L; (Y; t m ) = P"ml, where P"nll is the weighted average price for the segment. This
approach to calculating price takes into account the differences in brand sales. Before
being used in the analysis, the price data were divided by the relevant CPI .
The producer price index (PPI) is used as the price data for the industry
regressions. The monthly data are converted to quarterly data through simple averaging.
Because the data are an index there is no need to divide by the CPI.
Marketing Variables
Marketing variables are included with the presupposition that marketing efforts
will increase demand. The two marketing variables used are the percent of retail volume
in featured ads (Ma) and the percent of retail volume on display (Mb). Ma "measures the
percentage of the volume of a given brand sold during the quarter while featured in ...
newspaper advertising" (Haller, 1994). Mb "measures the percentage of the volume of a
given brand sold during the quarter in conjunction with some sort of in-store display ..."
(Haller, 1994). These variables are available only at the brand level.
Advertising
Like the marketing variables, advertising is often postulated to have a positive
impact on demand -both in total and for individual brands. Variables for own and rivals'
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advertising are included at the brand and segment stages. The industry regression has no
advertising variables due to a lack of available data. All of the advertising data come
from LNA and are not broken down by retail markets, hence each brand is assigned the
national value in each market. At the brand level there are the Avert and Adriv
advertising variables. Avert is own advertising expenditures and Adriv is the sum of
rivals' advertising. Rivals are competing brands in each segment and include only those
brands included in the data set.
Retail Dummv Variables
Included in the brand and segment level regression are several dummy variables.
These variables are included to account for regional differences in the structure of the
data. While there are 39 separate markets only 38 dummy variables are included to avoid
invertability of the design matrix. The intercept term should be interpreted as the fixed
effect of the 39th regional market. A table of all of the regional markets can be found in
the appendix.
Units per Pound
Units per pound (U;oI)is defined as the number of pounds sold divided by the
number of units sold. This measure is included to control for differences in package size
(e.g., a 10 oz. box vs. a 16 oz. economy size). This variable should account for differing
purchase decisions due to changes in packaging size. U;ntis included only in the brand
level regression.
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Population
Industry level demand includes a variable for population. Data for population
were taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States. It is expected that with an
increase in consumers there would be an increase in quantity sold. A population variable
is included only in the industry regression.
That completes the description of the model, the variables, and their data sources.
We now turn to the actual empirical results of estimating the demand system.
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CHAPTER Y
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter is comprised of the empirical results for the four main segments:
brand-level regular margarine, brand-level spread margarine, segment level, and industry
level. Due to the sheer number of estimates for market effects they will not be reported
on in this section.
Budget Shares
The budget shares of the brands indicate the relative size of each of the brands
within a segment. This information is useful when interpreting the cross-price
elasticities. The change in demand for a relatively large brand is unlikely to increase by a
large percentage when a small brand raises its price. This is because the shift in demand
from the small to large brand is a smaller percentage of the large brands total demand.
Conversely, a price increase of a large brand will tend to have a larger impact on demand
for a smaller brand.
The budget shares for the regular segment are in table 3. Fleischmanns' has the
largest budget share, accounting for 38% of the segment. Parkay is the next largest with
27% of the segment. These two players dominate the segment with a combined share of
65%. The smaller three players represent only 22% of the segment: Land 0' Lakes with
10%, Mazola with 8%, and Imperial with only 4%. The Private-Label composite is 13%
of the segment.
63
Table 3
Budget Shares for the Regular Margarine Segment
Brands Budget Shares
Fleischmanns 38%
Parkay 27%
Land 0' Lakes 10%
Imperial 8%
Mazola 4%
Private Label 13%
The budget shares for the spread segment are found in table 4. The two largest
brands, I Can't Believe Its Not Butter and Shedds Country Crock, represent 56% of the
expenditures in the spread segment with budget shares of 23% each. Blue Bonnet and
Promise are the next two largest brands with budget shares of 17% and IS % respectively.
The smallest brands are: Country Morning Blend (7%), Shedds (4%), and Parkay Light
(3%). The Private-Label composite is in the same size range as the smallest brands with a
budget share of 7% .
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Table 4
Budget Shares for the Spread Margarine Segment
Brands
23%
23%
17%
15%
7%
4%
3%
7%
Budget Shares
I Can't Believe Its Not Butler
Shedds Country Crock
Blue Bonnet
Promise
Country Morning Blend
Shedds
Parkay Light
Pri vate Label
The Regular Margarine Segment
The regular segment brand level results are presented in this section. The system
R' will be reported first, then the own and cross-price elasticities and finally the non-price
elasticities and control variables. The overall model had a system weighted R2 of
0.7909. This R' indicates that 79% of the variability in the dependent variables are
explained by the model. Considering the complexity of the model, this is an excellent fit.
All of the own- and cross-price elasticities for regular margarine are in table 5 (the
italicized values are t-statistics). Own-price elasticities are displayed along the main
diagonal and are in bold type. The cross-price elasticities are on the off-diagonal. The
columns of table 3 represent the percent change in quantity of the brand due to a one
6S
percent change in price of the brand in each row. For example, Fleischmanns' (column
one) quantity demand increases by .125% with a I% increase in Imperial's (row two)
pnce Conversely, the effect of a brand's pricing on other brands is read along the rows.
Table 5
Regular Margarine Own and Cross-Price Elasticities
Brands Fleischmanns Imperial Land 0' Mazola Parkay Private-
Lakes Label
Fleischmanns -1.293 0459 -0.064 0460 0.188 0.106
-23.127 4.171 -0.653 2.026 4.863 4.863
Imperial 0.126 -2.896 -0.011 0.174 0272 0.236
6.1i30 -21.067 -0113 2.379 8975 6.23/
Land 0' Lakes -0.013 -0.041 -I.103 -0.036 0.055 0.038
-0.665 -0.338 -0.113 -0.488 1.626 0.955
Mazola 0.040 0.061 -0.017 -1.988 0.017 0.0917
1.946 1.860 -0.628 -10.024 1.374 2.222
Parkay 0.150 0.814 0157 0.169 -1.695 0.3055
6.1i44 8156 1.626 1.952 -35.884 2.222
Private-Label 0056 0.351 0.064 0.365 0160 -1.861
1.1i61i 5.396 1.136 2.442 6.832 -22.939
".The top number 111 each cell IS the estimated coefficient.
The bottom number is the t-statistic.
The own-price elasticity of Land 0' Lakes is the only statistically insignificant
own-price elasticity in the study. Land 0' Lakes' price effect is significant in the system
only in the two cross-price elasticities between Land 0' Lakes and Parkay. At first glance
these results appear to suggest that Land 0' Lakes' margarine is insulated from pricing
effects of rivals. Unfortunately, this does not explain why Land 0' Lakes pricing has no
real effect on its own and rivals' demand. Future research will be needed to explain Land
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0' Lakes' weak results. Perhaps as the only agricultural cooperative in the industry, Land
0' Lakes behaves differently than investor-owned firms.
Fleischmanns' has the most inelastic demand with an estimated elasticity of -
1.293. Not surprisingly, as a large brand, Fleischmanns' pricing has a large effect on
rivals, especially on Imperial and Mazola. A one percent increase in Fleischmanns' price
increases Imperial's quantity by .459% and Mazola's quantity by .406%. Parkay, the other
large brand, has a smaller increase in quantity, only .188% with a one percent increase in
Fleischmanns' price.
Parkay has the largest effect on Fleischmanns' quantity, increasing quantity by
. I 50 % with a one percent change in price. A price increase by Imperial increases
Fleischmanns' quantity almost as much as Parkay, with a cross-price elasticity of .126.
This is interesting given that Parkay is almost three and a half times larger than Imperial.
Mazola, the smallest brand, and the Private-Label composite increases quantity for
Fleischmanns by only .040 % and .056% when they increase price by one percent.
Imperial is the most elastic brand with an estimated elasticity of -2.896. Imperial
has the strongest effects on Parkay and Private-Label with cross-price elasticities of .272
and .236 respectively. Imperial also has a significant effect on Mazola with a cross-price
elasticity of .174.
A one percent increase in Parkay's price results in a .814% jump in Imperial's
quantity, a huge change. As noted above Fleischmanns' has a cross-price elasticity of
.459. Even Private-Label has a large effect on Imperial with a cross-price elasticity of
.351. These high cross-price elasticities are consistent with Imperial's high own-price
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elasticity. Only Mazola has a small effect on Imperial's quantity with a cross-price
elasticity of .061 .
Mazolu has an own price elasticity of -1.988. The smallest brand in the regular
segment, Mazola has only small price effects on other brands' quantity. The cross-price
elasticity between Muzola and Private-Label is .092, which is the largest Mazola price
effect.
Parkay has an own-price elasticity of -1.695, the second most inelastic brand in
the segment. Imperial has the largest price effect on Parkay' s quantity. An increase in
Imperial's price increases Parkay's quantity by .272%. The high cross-price elasticities
between these two brands suggests that they are seen as substitutes, at least for a subset of
their customers. Other than the previously noted effects of Fleischmanns, Private-Label
has the next largest impact on Parkay. As Private-Label's price increase by one percent
Parkay's quantitv increases by .160%.
The Private-Label composite has a own-price elasticity of -1.861. Parkay has the
largest price effect on Private-Label with a cross-price elasticity of .306. Imperial also
has a largc price effect, increasing Private-Label sales by .234% with a one percent price
increase. Fleischmanns has a relatively small impact on Private-Label quantity with a
cross-price elasticity of . I06.
Overall the results for the regular segment are significant for 20 of the 30 cross-
price elasticities at the 90% significance level (two-tailed test). Only one of the
insignificant estimates -the cross-price elasticity of Fleischmanns' on Private Label- does
not involve Land 0' Lakes.
6R
The results in the next section are taken from table 6. Included are all of the non-
price variables in the regular segment model. Each variable's impact will he discussed
separately.
Table 6
Regular Margarine: Results for the Non-Price Regression Variables
Variable Fleischmanns Imperial Land 0' Lakes Mazola Parkay Private
Label
Intercept -0014 0.258 0.016 -0.179 0.100 0.002
-0913 2.073 0.059 -2.93 3.247 0.052
Expenditure 0.935 1.253 0.974 0.856 1.002 1.085
42.436 8.188 6.462 11.421 27.741 31.592
Percent 0.004 0.037 0.088 0.014 0031 -
Featured 1402 1835 2.382 3.271 3.031 -
Percent on ODD I 0.035 0.020 0.002 0.023 -
Display 0.56 3.001 0.951 0.839 2.613
-
Own Ad -0003 0.029 0.138 0.001 0.01 I -
Expenditure -0.63 1.559 5.083 0.067 1.381 -
Rivals Ad 0.028 -0.156 -0.040 -0.049 -0.017 -
Expenditure 3.338 -2.484 -0.436 -2.627 -1.303 -
Units per lb. 1.572 -0.526 -76.238 -2.205 0944 -
2971 -0.881 -0.323 -7379 0378 -
Trend -0.002 0.01 I 0.003 0.007 0.001 0.002
-3.302 2.392 0.284 2.622 0961 1.534
Tbe top number 111 eacb cell IS the estimated coefficient.
Tbe bottom number is the t-statistic.
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Expenditure
The expenditure elasticity is significant for all regular margarine brands. Imperial
margarine has the largest estimated expenditure elasticity at 1.25: Mazola has the lowest
with a .856 estimated expenditure elasticity. This indicates that there is an unequal
distribution of additional expenditures in the regular segment across brands. A one
percent increase in segment expenditure increases Imperial's quantity buy 1.25 percent
but Mazola enjoys only a .856 percent increase in sales volume.
Marketing Variables
For all of the branded regular margarines, the percent featured ad variable was
significant at the 90% confidence level. Feature ad marketing was most effective for
Land 0' Lakes with a one percent increase in feature ad marketing leading to .08 percent
increase in volume sold. Fleischmanns' sales increased by only .004 percent with a one
percent increase in ad marketing.
Only two of the margarines, Imperial and Parkay, had significant results for
display marketing. A one percent increase in display lead to an increase in sales of .0358
for Imperial and .023 for Parkay. The Private-Label composite did not use either
marketing tool.
Media Advertising
A brand's own media advertising expenditure was hypothesized to be positively
related to sales. Three of the branded margarines had significant results supporting this
hypothesis. A one percent increase in advertising expenditure increased Land 0' Lakes'
sales by .138 percent. The results for Imperial and Parkay are less dramatic with
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estimated coefficients of .029 and .0 II, respectively. Private-Label had no expenditures
for media advertising.
Includcd in each brand's equation was the sum of rivals' advertising, which was
hypothesized to be negatively related to sales. This negative relationship was found for
Mazola, Imperial, and Parkay. Imperial's sales decrease by .155 percent with an
additional percent of rival's advertising expenditure. Mazola and Parkay's sales decrease
by only .049 and .Ol7, respectively. Interestingly, Fleischmanns exhibited a positive
relationship between rivals advertising expenditure and sales with an estimated
coefficient of .028, suggesting this brand benefits from the advertising of its rivals more
than from its own advertising. Land 0' Lakes had a statistically insignificant result.
Unit per Pound
Only two of the branded regular margarines had significant estimated coefficients
1'01' unit per pound control variable. Fleischmanns' sales increased by 1.572 % as the sales
units increased by 1%. Mazola's sales decreased by 2.205% as sales units increased by
I%. An increase in sales due to an increase in units per pound means that as the
containers increase in size quantity increases. It may be that Flieischmanns significantly
lowers its price per pound with larger containers leading to higher sales volume. Mazola
may not significantly lower its average price per pound with its larger containers hence its
drop in sales volume with larger packages. Further research is needed to determine the
degree of differences in unit pricing across brands.
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A time variable was included to account for any residual time trends existing in
the data after differencing. The trend estimates, unlike the other parameter estimates, are
not elasticities. The estimates should be interpreted as the percent change in sales volume
due to an increase in time measured in quarters of a year. The sign indicates whether the
sales volume is increasing or decreasing over time, given the effects of the other variables
The trend variable was significant for four of the six regular margarines at the
90% confidence level. Of the margarine brands with significant trend values only
Fleischmanns has a negative trend coefficient (-.002). Imperial (.0107), Mazola (.007),
and Private label (.002) all had positive estimated coefficients. Land 0' Lakes and Parkay
had an insigmficant estimated trend coefficient.
The Spread Margarine Segment
This section will examine the results of the demand system for the margarine
spread scgmcnl. Keeping with the preceding section, the order of presentation will be
budget shares, price elasticities (own and cross) will be reported first. Then the results for
the other variables included in the demand system are discussed. The model had a system
weighted R' of 0.7556, similar to that found in the regular margarine segment.
Prices
The own-price elasticities for the spreads are along the main diagonal in table 7
below. The price effects for each regression equation are read as in table 5. For example,
the estimated own-price elasticity for private label's price in the Promise equation is .096
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and the estimated own-price elasticity for Promise's price in the private label equation is
.155.
All of the own-price elasticities are significant at the 99% significance level in the
spread segment. The elasticities range from the highly elastic Shedds (-3.473) to the
relatively inelastic Country Morning Blend (-1.087). Interestingly, Shedds elasticity is
twice that of Shedds Country Crock (-1.725); the two products are from the same brand
family.
Of the cross-price elasticities, 36 of the 56 are statistically different from zero at
the 90% confidence level. Of the 36 significant cross-price elasticities only five are
negative - the cross-price elasticity of "I Can't Believe Its Not Butter" (lCBINB) on
Shedds is the only estimate of the five that does not involve Private Label. Private Label
has a negative cross-price elasticity for Country Morning Blend and Parkay Light.
Conversely, both Country Morning Blend and Parkay Light have negative cross-price
elasticities for Private Label. The prices for Blue Bonnet and Promise were significant in
all system demand equations except for Blue Bonnet in the Shedds' equation.
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Table 7
Spread Margarine Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities
Brands Blue CMB [CBINB Parkay Promise Shedds Shedds Private-
Bonnet Light Cntry C. Label
Blue -2.083 0.228 0.110 0.173 0.259 -0.148 0.318 0.446
Bonnet -27.767 3.998 2.992 4.1l5 4.085 -0.744 9.887 8.069
eMB 0.072 -1.087 0.048 0.056 0.089 -0 112 -0015 -0.369
2.799 -8. 709 1.130 0654 3.331 -1.383 -0450 -4.633
[CBINB 0.000 0.083 -1.463 0.318 0.090 -0.467 0.329 0.311
-0.001 0.598 -15.240 2.772 1.490 -2.482 5.352 2.503
Parkay 0019 0.022 0.052 -1.443 0032 -0.024 0.005 -0109
Light 2.073 0555 3.156 -20.308 3.097 -0.839 0.418 -3.305
Promise o 131 0137 0058 0.116 -2.043 1.913 0.078 0.155
2312 2.612 1.700 2.663 -19.702 6.351 2.648 3.020
Shedds -0.007 -0.020 -0.026 0.017 0.571 -3.473 0.082 0.053
-0141 -0.484 -0.927 0.563 7.186 -lJ033 3.373 1.290
Shedds 0.310 -0.096 0.353 0.016 0.147 0.182 -1.725 0.166
Cntry C. 6.251 -0.888 5804 0.187 2.731 1.072 -24.576 1.690
Private- 0.158 -0.328 0.116 -0.199 0.096 0.025 0068 -1.835
Lahel 6.992 -4548 3.367 -3.075 4.099 0.354 2.460 -20.293-I'he top number >11 each cell IS the estimated coefficient.
The bottom number is the t-statistic.
The results for the non-price variables in the spread segment model are included
in table 8. Each variable's impact will be discussed separately.
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Expenditures
Allor the estimated expenditure elasticities are significant at the 99% confidence
level and have the hypothesized positive sign. The estimates range from .751 for I Can't
Believe its Not Butter to 2.104 for Shedds. Shedds' volume sold increases by over two
percent as spread segment expenditures increase by one percent.
Marketing Variables
The estimated coefficients for Percent on Featured Ad, were positive and
significant for three of the brands: Blue Bonnet, Country Morning Blend, and I Can't
Believe its Not Butter. Surprisingly, two of the brands, Parkay Light and Parkay, had
negative estimates. None of the estimates the for Percent on Featured Ad was greater
than .025, indicaung very week responses, if any, from featured ad.
The other marketing variable, Percent on Display, had a significant estimated
coefficient for Blue Bonnet, Country Morning Blend, Shedds, and Shedds Country Crock.
Shedds had the largest elasticity with a one percent increase in volume on display leading
to an increase of .183 percent of sales volume. The elasticities for the other brands were
much smaller.
Media Advertising
The effect of brand advertising should be to increase brand sales. Surprisingly,
only Promise (.087) and I Can't Believe Its Not Butter (.054) had positive and significant
estimates. Three of the branded spreads, Blue Bonnet (-.002), Parkay Light (-.002), and
Shedds Country Crock (-.005), were negative and "significant" at the 90% significance
7S
level. These rcsu Its might be due to the lack of advertising data for each of the retail
markets.
Rivals' advertising often decreases sales by luring customers to other products.
This expectation held only for Blue Bonnet (-.047) and I Can't Believe Its Not Butter
(-.027). Parkay Light (.100), Promise (.106), and Shedds Country Crock (.014) all had
positive estimates for rival's advertising. Advertising could provide a free ride for a rival,
increasing the rival's sales if the advertising does not significantly differentiate the brand
frorn the general segment.
Unit per Pound
Only three of the five'o branded spreads had significant estimates for Unit per
Pound. Blue Bonnet (.359) and Promise (8.464) and Shedds Country Crock (.262) all had
positive estimates - the Promise estimate is surprisingly large. Shedds and I Can't Believe
Its Not Butter had negative estimates but were statistically insignificant. As with the
regular margarine it may be that brands do not equally discount their larger containers.
Of the eight brands only Promise and Shedds had insignificant estimated
coefficients for the time trend. Private Label (.002) and Blue Bonnet (.003) had positive
estimates for the trend - sales have been increasing over time due to some factor not
accounted for in the model. Country Morning Blend (-.004), I Can't Believe Its Not
in Unit of sale was not included in the Country Morning Blend equation. The unit of sale
was constant over the time period resulting in zero for all values. Inclusion would have
prohibited estimation of the equation.
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Butler (-.003), Parkay Light (-.004). and Shedds Country Crock (-.002) all have had sales
decrease when ali other variables in the model are held constant.
Table 8
Spread Margarine Non-Price Regression Variables
Variable Blue CMB ICBINB Parkay Promise Shedds Shedds
Private-
Bonnet Lizht Cntry C.
Label
Intercept 0.134 0043 0056 0.011 -0.029 0.259 0.027
0.010
2.979 1.304 2.503 0.453 -0.254 0.696 1.396 0.288
Expenditure 1.399 j .062 0.751 0.946 0.758 2.104 0.859
1.182
20.924 21.561 21.897 24.080 6.676 5.410 28.882 27.255
Trend 0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.015
-0.002 0.002
1.753 -3.161 -3.219 -4.108 -1.082 1.1 12 -2.982 1.852
Percent 0.025 0.010 0.010 -0.007 -0.048 -0.030 0.006
-
Featured 2.4XX 4.303 2.2X1 -2.316 -2.772 -0.626 1.437
-
Percent on 0.020 0004 0.001 -0.00 I -0.001 0.183 0.007
-
Display 3.131 2.nO 0.667 -0.448 -0.175 4.567 2.218
-
Own Ad -0002 -0.001 0.054 -0.002 0.087 -0.174 -0.005
-
Expenditure -1.616 -0.9XX 4.1XO -2114 4.0XO -1.520 -2.547 -
Rivals Ad -0.047 -0.003 -0.027 0.100 0.106 -0.046 0.014
-
Expenditure -3.14X -0.31X -3.659 10540 2.790 -0.753 2.211 -
Units per lb. 0.359 - -0.071 -0.090 8.464 -1.607 0.262 -
3461 - -0.074 -1.455 2.153 -0.672 6053 -
The top number 111 each cell IS the estimated coefficient.
The bottom number is the t-statistic.
Segment Level Regression Coefficients
The results from the segment level regressions are reported in this section. The
segment level regressions are the aggregations of the regular and spread segments. The
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segment model has two equations. one for the regular segment and one for the spread
segment. The results for the segment level regressions are found in table 9.
Estimated own-price elasticities for the spreads and regular margarine at the
segment level are very similar - - 1.345 for spreads versus -1.386 for regular margarine.
Both estimates are statistically significant at the 95% level. The cross-price elasticities
are also very similar and significant; .345 for spreads and .386 for regular margarine.
Expenditure was significant with elasticity measures of .959 for spreads and 1.041
for regular margarine. Spread and regular margarine have equal market shares so the
Engle aggregation restriction was .5 h, +.5h, = 1. As a result the expenditure elasticity
estimates average to 1.
The results for all of the elasticities are significant and of the hypothesized sign.
Given the brand level elasticity estimates the segment results appear to be of the proper
magnitude. It is expected that increases in aggregation will lead to less elastic measures.
Only Country Morning Blend was less elastic than the segment elasticity measure and
only Fleischmanns was less elastic than the regular margarine elasticity estimare.'!
Advertising expenditures are hypothesized to have a positive effect on quantity
demanded and a negative effect on rivals' quantity. While the estimated coefficients for
regular and spread advertising have the hypothesized signs for each equation. only the
estimated coefficient for advertising expenditures for regular margarine demand was
significant.
H Land 0' Lakes was not considered because the estimate was not statistically significant.
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The estimated effect of regular advertising on regular demand is .002 - a one percent
increase in advertising expenditure yields a .002 percent increase in volume sold.
A time trend variable was also included in the segment level system. The trend
was insignificant for the both Spread and Regular margarine segments. Suggesting that
margarine sales volume has not been systematically increasing or decreasing over lime
when other variables are accounted for.
Table 9
Segment Regression Estimates
Variable Spreads Regular
Intercept -0.023 -0.009
-2.563 -0.902
Spreads .1.345 0.345
-65.379 I6.763
Regular 0.386 .1.386
21.359 -76.756
Expenditure 0.959 1.041
79.591 86356
Spread 0.005 -0.008
Advertising 0.858 -1.25I
Regular -0.000 0.002
Advertising -0.259 2.730
Time -0.000 -0.000
-0.796 -0.199
The top number III each cell IS the estimated coefficient.
The bottom number is the t-statistic.
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Industry Level
The final level of analysis, and the most aggregated, is the industry regression
equation. The results from the regression are reported in table 10. The results are
presented in the -.une order as the previous models.
The results at the industry level are much less robust than the brand and segment
level models. The R' for the regression was .4938 - much lower than the other
regressions. The estimated coefficient for the industry price elasticity is -.584, but it is
insignificant. The estimated coefficient for price of butter had an unexpected negative
sign of -.7, but it too is insignificant at the 95% significance level. Only the population
variable Was significant with a parameter estimate of 31.373 -an unbelievable result given
that it is unlikely that a one percent increase in the population would lead to a 31.373
percent increase in margarine sales. It is clear that the industry regression is not robust,
possibly due to data limitations, improper model specification, or both. The use of a
aggregated quantity measure from the truncated IRI data set may not be the most
appropriate measure of industry demand for margarine. A future regression model that
used a quantity measure from the Statistical Abstract of the United States, which was the
source for the independent variables, might yield better results.
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Table 10
Industry Results
Variable Estimate t-statistic
Price of Margarine -0.584 -0.835
Price of Butter -0.7 -1.287
Population 31.373 3.312
Income A.996 -0.634
Intercept -0.072 -1.58
~, __ ••o~ o>_. __ ...~ O~~,A~__'~~_,W_M"·~_"_~~ __'o'_·~_~· '
N=30, R2 = .4938
Due to the weak results of the industry regression, the calculation of
unconditional elasticities will not be performed in this Thesis. Future analysis may lead
to a robust model for industry level margarine demand. Using better data, the first order
differential model may result in robust estimates of elasticities. These estimates could be
used with the brand and segment level results to convert the conditional elasticities into
unconditional price elasticities.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The industrial organization literature is filed with a variety of theory and empirical
work attempting to understand the structure of markets. The reason for this interest stems
from the basic premise that competitive markets yield efficient allocations of society's
scarce resources. When markets are not competitive resources are not put toward their
optimal use. Assessing competitive performance is essential for designing and applying
governmental policy designed to correct market imperfections.
Much of the early work in industrial organization focused on basic structural
variables (e.g., number of firms, CR4, or H-index) to determine market performance. In
the early 1980s economists began to look at more rigorous models derived from
economic theory to examine market performance. Recent availability of detailed point of
sale data bas created opportunities to use more complex econometric models.
The research of this thesis takes advantage of supermarket scanner data to apply
brand level demand models to the margarine industry. The demand models were used to
estimate own- and cross-price elasticities that could be used to assess the degree of
product differentiation, a form of market power. Before the empirical model was
specified, a review of the conditions for consumer aggregation was presented in Chapter
3.
In Chapter 3 it was shown that the first order differential demand model
will be consistent with consumer aggregation only if it has an elasticity structure
consistent with a utility function of the Gormon form. This structure was derived by
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substituting the general utility function of Hang and Hauhn with a Gormon form utility
function. Even though this elasticity structure must be assumed, the derivation shows
that the first order demand model is not inherently inconsistent with a utility structure
needed for consumer aggregation. Many empirical demand models, such as the log-log
model, are not derivable from a utility function and are therefore structurally inconsistent
with demand theory.
The empirical estimation using scanner data was successful - the estimated price
elasticities were largely significant and credible. The brand level model also estimated
the effects of two in store marketing variables on demand, percent on featured advertising
and percent on display. Most of the significant estimated coefficients were positive (sales
volume increased) for brands that were 'featured' in store advertising. However, two
brands had estimated coefficients that were negative when featured in an in-store
advertisement .. All of the significant estimates for percent of a brand's sales that were on
display were positive. Overall, in store marketing factors increase the quantity demanded
for a brand.
Unlike the in store marketing factors, advertising were often not of the hypothesized sign.
A brand's advertising expenditures should lead to greater sales for the brand. Many of
the brand had negitive estimated coefficents for own-advertising effects, suggesting a
decrease in sales volume. The advertising data were not as rich as the in store marketing
variables - there was no variation in the advertising variables across markets. Of the 12
brands, nine were significant but only five of these had the expected positive sign.
Effects by rival's advertising can be hypothesized to be either negative or positive.
While rivals' advertising may draw sales for a brand it is possible that rivals' advertising
increases the brand's sales. If the advertising does not significantly differentiate the
brands from the general product segment then rivals may be providing an advertising free
ride for the brand. The estimated coefficients for rivals' advertising did differ by sign.
Even though the results are not in conflict with theory they should be interpreted with
caution in-light of the data issues discussed above.
The results at the segment level were robust. All of the price and expenditure
elasticities were significant and had the hypothesized signs. Advertising expenditures
were also significant for regular margarine, but not for the spread segment. Rival's
advertising was not significant for either segment. As with the brand level regressions,
the advertising data did not vary across markets, possibly reducing its impact.
While model estimation was successful, Land 0' Lakes was an exception. Land
0' Lakes brand margarine did not yield significant results in the demand estimation. It
may be that as a cooperative-owned brand, Land 0' Lakes may respond to market
conditions differently than investor owned firms. But this would not explain why
Country Morning Blend, another Land 0' Lakes brand, was estimated successfully in the
spread segment. Possibly data collection or processing errors are the cause of the weak
results.
The robust brand level elasticity estimates clearly show that the margarine
industry is significantly differentiated. In both the brand and the segment level
estimations price elasticities revealed that I % price increases lead to a drop in sales of no
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more than 3 % for any brand - considerably less than the 100% drop expected in the
perfectly competitive market.
Major market structures are shown in Table 11 (a repeat of Table I). Given that
the margarine industry is differentiated, the industry's market structure can be narrowed
down to just two possible structures - differentiated oligopoly or monopolistic
competition. Either is sufficient to conclude the existence of market power. Re-quoting
Scherer and Ross "Pure monopolists, oligopolists, and monopolistic competitors share a
common characteristic: each recognizes that its output decisions have a perceptible
influence on price .... All three types possess ... market power "." (Scherer and Ross,
1990 p. 17)
Table 11
Principal Seller's Market Structure Types
N umber of Sellers
One A Few Many
Products
Homogeneous Pure Homogeneous Pure
monopoly oligopoly competition
Ditferentiated Pure multiproduct Differentiated Monopolistic
monopoly oligopoly competition
The importance of finding market power in the margarine industry is not so much
that consumers pay too high a price for margarine. The importance is more that it
suggests that industries in general do not have a perfectly competitive structure. The
12italicized in original
margarine product is by its physical nature relatively homogenous. However, these
results suggest firms have found ways to create brand differentiation with out resulting to
physical changes. Consumers have responded to the various strategies firms have used to
differentiate their brands. As the degree of product differentiation increases the
probability [or market power increases. If market power is prevalent, then perfect
competition is not.
If scanner data were more readily available to researchers, both 10 and demand
economists would be able to improve their contributions. Scanner data afford the
researcher the ability to model markets at the brand level and in the future possibly at the
product level. Future studies might model the change of demand conditions over time or
across markets. However, such scanner data are not widely available and typically
include confidentiality clauses that limit their usefulness for public research. Thus,
although the promise is exciting the reality is frustrating to public research.
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APPENDIX
SAS Programs for Brand Level Demand
data thesis:
lnfilc '/usr2/SAS/s;1s609/dalU4ll.csY· dlm=-',' Irecle I00000;
input Year Quarter MRK1D vi v2 V) v4 v5 vf \'7
vpls v8 v9 vro vii vl2 vplr PI P2 Pol P4 P5 P6 P7 pH
p9plOplj pl2ppiAI A2A:lA4A5A6A7A8A9AIOAI1 AI2
mal mb I ma21l1b2 IlKl3mb3 maambq maf mb5 mao mb6 ma7 mb7 ma8
mb81l1a9mb9malOmhlOlllulJ mhllmal2mhl2
Tillll:uJ u2u3u4u5u6u7u8u9ulOuil ul2EXPscxpr
sal sa2 sa3 sa4 saS sa6 sa? sa8 sa9 salu sa! I .~a12:
If MRKID=l then Dl=-]; else Dl=O:
If MRKID=3 then 0:1=[, else 0.1=0;
[I' MRKID=c.4 then 04=1: else [)4=():
If MRKID=5 then D5= I: else 1)5=0;
If M RK 10=8 then 08= I. else D8=():
If MRKID=11 then DJ 1=1: else D II=U:
If MRKID= 12 then [) 12= I: else D 12=0:
If MRKID=13 then 01.1=1; else DI3=O;
[I' fvtRKJI)=14 then D 14= I, else D 14=0;
If MRKfO=15 then 015=1: else 015=0,
IfMRKID=16 then 016=1: clxe 1)16=0;
If MRKID= 18 then D IH=I: else f) 18=();
If MRKID=D then 02:1=1: else 023=0;
If MRKIO=24 then 024= I. else D24=0;
If MRKID=25 then 025=1. else 025=0:
If MRKID=26 then 026=1; else 026=0:
If MRKID=27 then 027=1: else 027=0:
If MRKID=29 then 029=1: else 029=0:
[f MRK[0=:11 then OJ 1=1: else 0:11=0:
IfMRKID=.12 then 0.12=1: else lYU=O:
If MRKID=:1:11hcn D.1.1=I:cbe D3:1=0;
If MRKID=:14then lJ:l4=L else D:14=0;
If MRKlIJ=35 then 035= l ;clxc 1):15=0;
If MRKID=.16thcn 0.16=1: else 1)36=0:
If MRKID=.17 then D:17=1;else 0:17=0;
If MRKID=3H then D.1g=l; else 0.18=0:
If MRKID=.19 then D39=1: else 039=0;
If !\1J{KID=4o then D~O=I, else D40=0;
If MRKID=41 then 041= I: else 041=0:
If MRKJD=4:1 then D43=1: else 04]=0;
If MRKID=44 then 044= I: else 044=0.
If l\1HKfO=45 then 1)45=1; else 1)45=();
rr MRK ID=4K then 048= I. else [)4S=O:
If MRKID=49 then 049=1, else 049={);
If MRKID=53 then 053= I; else 05.1=0;
If MRKJl)=54 then 054=1: else 054=0;
If MRKID=61 then 061=1.clsc D61=0;
If i\IRKID=6.1then 06.1=1: else 06.1=0;
If MRKID=65 then 065=1; else D65=O:
run;
proc syslin itsur octnethcsis convcrgeeul llIaxiter=200:
<l modelv8=exprPHP9plOPII Pl2 PplTIME
til d4 d5 d8 dll dl2 dlJ dt4 dt5 dl6dlHdD d24 d25 d26 cJ27d29 dll dJ2 d3.1d34
d.15 cJ36dJ7 d.18dY:Jd40 d4 I d41 d44 d45 d48 d49 dS3 d54 dbl d6:1d65
MAS MB8 AS sa8 llR:
rGslric! p8+p9+p 1O+pll+pI2+ppl+cxpr=O;
b: model v9=expr PH P9 plO PII PI:! Ppl TIME
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SAS Programs for Brand Level Demand cont.
d3 d4 dS dH ell J dl~ elL{ dl4 dIS clio dIS d~.1 d24 d25 d26 d27 d29 d.11 d.12 d:n d.14
d:'lS tD6 d.17 oJ/l dW d4{) d41 <143d44 d45 d48 d49 dS} d54 d61 d6.1 d65
MA9 MA9 A9 sa9 uc:
restrict pH+p9+p [O+p I I +p 12+ppl+cxpr:=O:
c mode! vl Oeexpr PH 1'9 plO PI r PI2 Prj TIME
d.1 d4 dS <18ell J ell2 <In dl4 diS dl6 dl8 d23 d24 ellS d26 dn d29 d31 d32 d3.1lB4
d35 d36 (1;17d3H d.19 d40 d41 d43 d44 d45 d4H d49 dS} d54 d6l d63 d65
MAIO MAIO alO s,l!U lIIU:
restrict p8+p9+plO+p I I +p J 2+ppl+cxpr:=O:
d: lHoddvll=cxprPt;P9pIOPIJ PI2 PplTlME
(D d4 ciSciSau dll dJ3 d14 diS dl6 dl8 <123d24 el25 d26 d27 d29 d31 ell2 d3J d34
dJ.'i d:l6 d37 d38 d39 d4() 04 J d43 d44 d45 d48 d49 dS3 d54 d6J d63 d65
MAlI MBII all sat t ull:
restrict p8+pY+pJ O+pJ I+p 12+ppl+cxpr:::O:
e moddvl2=exprP8P9plOPJI PI2 PplTIME
d3 d4dS d8 ell I dl2 tin dl4 dl5 dl6dl8 d23 d24 d2S d26 d27 d29 d:\1 d32 d33 d34
d.15 d36 d37 ,1:\8 dll.) d40 d41 d41 d44 d45 d4H d49 d53 d54 d61 d6l d65
MAI2 MBI2 nIl sal::' u12;
restrict p8+p9+pl O+pII +pI2+ppl+expr=O;
f: rnodeJvplr=exprP8P9pIOPII PI2 PplTIME
d1 d4 el5 d8 dll dl2 dn dl4 drS diG dl8 dl1 d24dlS d26d27 d29 d31 d32 d:B (134
<1.15d36 d37 d.18 dl9 d40 d41 d43 d44 d45 d48 d49 dSl d54 d61 d63 d65;
restrict p8+p9+pIO+pll+pI2+ppl+cxpr=O;
sresurct
.3825693 "a.ex pr+.0828384 "b.expr- .0997484 "c.ex pr+.0358 I06*d.expr+ .26S0956*e.ex pr
+, 1309377*f.expr= I,
2.6139*b.p8+b.expr-12.0717*a.p9-n.expr=O.
IO.0252*b.p IO+b,expr-12.07 [7*c.p9-c.expr=O,
27.9248*b.pll +b,cxpr-12.0717*d.p9-d.expr=O,
3.73*b.pI2+b.expr-12.0717*e.p9-e.expr=O.
7.6372*b,ppl+h.expr-12.0717*f.p9-fexpr=O.
IO.02S2*a.p IO+a,expr -2.6139*c.pH -c.expr=O.
27.9248"'a.pll +a.expr-2.6139*d.p8-d,expr=O,
3,73*3. P12+a.expr -2.6 I39*e.pH-e.ex pr=O,
7.6372*a ppl+a.expr-2.6139*f.pH-r.cxpr=O.
27.924H*c.p II +c.expr-I O.02.'i2*d.pl O-d.expr=O.
3.73*c.pI2+c.cxpr-1 O.0252*c.pl O-e.expr=O.
7 ,6372*c. ppl+c,expr- !n,02Sl *f.p I0- f.expr=O.
1,73*d.pI2+d.expr-27.9248*e.p II-c.expr=O,
7.6172*d.ppJ+d.expr-27 .9248*f.p II -fexpr=O.
7,6172"e.ppl +c.cxpr -~.73*f P 12-fcx pr=O;
J'llll.
rUIl.
d,lla thesis;
Infile '/lIsr2/SAS/sa~6D9/daI041I.csv· dlm=',' Irecl=rOOOOO;
input Year Quc1.l1crMRKID v I v2 v~ v4 v5 v6 v7
vpls vR v9 vlO vI I vl2 vplr PI P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 p8
p9 pJO pi J pl2 ppl AI A2 A3 A4 AS A6 A7 AS A9 AIO All Al2
1ll;)1mbl rnn2 mb2 ma3 mh1 ma4 ruM m<l5 Illb5 ma6 mb6 rna7 mb7 ma8
mbS llIa91l1b91llClIOmhlO lila I I mhll moll whl2
Time ul u2 u1 u4 uS u6u7 uSu9ulOuil ul2 EXPsexpr
s,lI sa2 saJ sa4 sa) s,16sa7 sa8 sa9 sa 10 sa I I sa 12;
If MRKID=I Ihen DI=I, else 01=0:
If MRKID=3 then D3=1: else D3=0;
If MRKID=4 lhen 04=1: else 04=0;
If MRKID=5 then D5=1; else D5=0;
If MRKIO=8 then D8= I, else D8=0;
If MRKID=11 then 011=1; else DII=O;
If IvtRKIO=12 then DI2=1; el.<;eDI2=0:
If MRKID=I J lhen DU=I; dse 013=0:
IfMRKID=14Ihcn DI4=L else 014=0;
88
SAS Programs for Brand Level Demand cont.
If MRK lD=:l S then IJ J 5= I. cbc D15=0.
[I' MRK [[)= 16 then lJ I (1= 1: else D 16=0:
If MRK 10= I B then fJ I H= I; else I) J B=O:
If MRKID=~:1 then D23=I: else D2~=(}:
If MRKID=24Ihcll D14=1: else D24=0;
If MRKID=25 then D~5= I. else D25=0:
If MRKID=26 then 026= I: else D26=0;
If MRKJD=17 then D27=1. else D27=();
If MRKID=29 then D29=J: else 029=0;
If MRKID=JI then OJ 1=1, else D31=O:
If MRKID=:n then 032= I: else 032=0:
If MRKID=D then DJ]:::: I; else D11=0;
If MRKID=J4 then 034= J. else 034=0;
IfMRKID=J5then OJ5:::!. else D35=0;
If MRKID=16 then 01(}::: I; else DJ6=();
If MRKID=J7 then D37=1: else DJ7=();
If MRKID=J8 then 0.18= I, else D38=0;
If MRKID=W then DJ~=I. else D39=0;
If MRKID=40 then D40:;;:;I: else 1)40=0:
If MRKID=41 then D41::: I: else 041 :::0;
If MRKJl)=43 then 041::: I: else 041:::0:
IfMRKID:::44 then 044:::1. else D44:::0:
If MRKID:::45 then D45:::1: else 045:::0:
If MRKID=48 then D48:::1: else 048=0:
If MRKID=49 then D4C)=I: else D49:::0:
If MRKID=51 then 05:'>:::1.else 051=0;
If MRKID=54 then D54=!, else D54=0;
If MRKID:::61 then 061=1: else 061:::0:
If MRKID=6:' then D6.1:::I: else 06.1=0;
IfMRKID=65 then 065=1: else 065=0:
run:
proc syslin itsur dat;l:::thcsi.~convcrgceu.t 1ll,'lxitcr:::200:
a: model vf e cxps PI P2plP4P5p6p7PplTlME
d3 d4 d5 dB ull dl2 d13 dl4 dl5 dl6 dl8 dn d14 d25 d16 d27 d19d.11 d31 tiD d14
d35 d.16 d37 d38 d3l! L!40d41 d4:'1d44 d45 d48 d49 u53 d54 d61 d61 d65
MAl MBI Al sal ul;
restrict pI +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p7 +ppl+exps:::O:
1.1' model v2= cxps PI P2 p3 P4 P5 p6 p7 PrJ TIME
d1 d4 d5 u8 dll d12d13 dl4 dl5 dl6 dl8 u23 d24 d25 d26 d27 d29d31 d32 d:'l3 d34
d35 d36 d37 d38 tl19 d40 d4! d43 J44 d45 048 d49 (1."i3d54 d6 I d61 tl65
MA2 MB2,'i2 sa2 .
restrict pI +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p7+ppl+exps=O;
C" model \'3::: exp.' PI P2 p3 P4 P5 po 1'7 Ppl TIME
tl3 d4d5 dS til I elI2 d!3 dl4 £115dl6 dl8 <123d24d25 d26 d27 d29 el31 tl32 d33 d34
d.15 d36 d37 <.138d3l.)d40 d41 d43 d44 d45 d48 d49 dS1 tlS4 d6 J d63 d65
MA3 MB3 a3 sa3 u3;
restrict p I+p2+p~+p4+p5+p6+p7 +ppl+exps:::O:
d: model \'4= eX[1sPI P2 rJ P4 PS p6 p7 Ppl TIME
el3 d4 d5 dS dl I dl ~ <llJ dl4 dl5 dl6 .us d23 d14 d25 d26 d27 d29 tl31 d32 d33 dJ4
d~5 d36 d17 d3S tl39 d40 d4 [ d4.1 <144d45 d48 d49 d53 d54 d61 d61 <165
MA4 MB" a4 sa4 u4:
restriCl pI +p2+pl+p4+r5+p6+p 7+ppl+exps:;:O.
e: model \"5= exps PI P2 pJ P4 P5 pb p7 Ppl TIME
d3 d4 d5 dS dll dl2 dD dl4 dl5 dl6 dIg u23 d24 d25 d2fl d27 d29d3J d32 d33 d34
d35 d36 ul? ellS d.19 d..tOd41 d43 d44 d45 d4S <149d53 d54 d61 d63 tiM
MA5 MB5 a5 sa5 u5.
restrict pi +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p 7+ppl+exps:::U;
f. modet \'6= exps PI Pl p3 P4 P5 1'6 p7 Ppl TIME
d3 d4 d5 d8 ull dl2 elD dl4 dIS dl6dl8 d23 d24 d25 d26 d27 d29 d31 dJ2 d33 d34
d35 d30 d37 el3x d39 tl40 d41 d41 d44 d45 £148d49 tlS1 d54 d6 I d6J d65
MA6 MR6 a6 sa6 u6:
restrict pi +p2+pl+p4+p5+p6+p7+ppl+cxp.,=O;
g: mudel v7= exps PI P1 1'1 P4 P5 p6 p7 Prl TIME
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d3 d4 dS dH (Ill d12 <lD <114elL'i dlf diS <12.1 d24 d25 d26 (117 d29 d3J d32 <13.1d14
1.1.15d36 d37 d}l:l d3lJ d4{) d4l don d44 d45 d48 d49 dS} d54 d61 d63 d65
MA7 MB? a7 s:17 u7;
restnct pI +p2+p3+p4+p5+p6+p 7+ppJ+cxps=O:
h model vpls;;;:exps PI P2 p3 P4 P5 pf 1'7 Ppt TIME
d;\ d4d.'i d8dll dJ2dD dJ4 dIS dl6 dlRd2.1 d14d15 d26d27 d29d3J d32d33 <134
d35 d36 d37 cL\8d.W d40 t141 d43 d44 d45 <148049 d53 d54 d6 [ d6:! d65:
restrict pi +p2+pJ+p4+pS+p6+p7 +ppl -cx ps==O;
srestrict ./705309*a.cx lh+ .0725 217"'h.exps+.2344473*c.exps+.OJ35613*d.cxp.<>+. J 492/ 38 "e.ex ps
+.040336*fexpH.2334696*g,CXpH.0659 I94*h.exp,s= I,
5.864*b.p I-eb.exps-! J 789"'a.p2-;I.exps=O,
5.864 *c.p I .ec.cxps -4.26515 ;'a.pJ -u.ex ps:::O.
5.864*d. p I-d.exps -29,7962 *' ,I.p4 -a.expsen.
5.864*e. pi -c.exps -6,70 179*a.p'i -n.cx ps:::O.
5.864*f,pl +f.exps-24.7917*a.p6-a.exps=O.
5.864 "'g.p I+g.ex[)S-4.2Kt2*a.p 7-a.cx ps=O.
5.864"'h.p 1+h.cxps-15. J 7*a ppt-a.expsetj.
I:I.789*c .p2+c.exp~ -4.265:15 "'h.p~ -bcx ps=O.
13,789*d.p2+J .cxps -2tJ.7%2 *b.p4 -b.expxeO.
1:1,789*e, p2+e.cxps-(,.70 J79*h.p5 -b.ex ps=O.
13.789*f.p2+f.exps-24.7917*h.p6-h.exps=O.
13.789*g.p2+g.ex ps-4.28J2*h.p7 -n .expseO,
13.789*h.p2+h.cxps- J 5.17"'b.ppl-b.exps=O.
4-.26535'"d.p3+d. exps -29.7962 "c. p4 -c .cx p.s:::O.
4.26535*e.p3+c.cxp';-6.70179*c.p5-c.exps:::O.
4.26535 *fp3+f.exps-24. 79 I7*c.p6-c.exps=O.
4.26535*g pf-eg.cxr», -4 ,2832 *c.p7 -c.expseu,
4.26535"'h.p3+h.cxps -15. J 7*c.ppl-c.ex p,<;=O.
29 .7962*e, pa-c.cxps-o. 70 I79*d, pS -d.cxpse O,
29,7962* f.p4+f.ex ps -24. 7917*d .p6 -d.expsen,
29.7962*g,p4+g.cxps-4.2832*d.p7-d.cxps:::O.
29 .7962*h. p-i-sh.cxps -15.17*d.ppl-d.cx ps:::O.
6.70 179*f. p5+f.cx ps -24. 7917 *c ,p6-e.exps=O.
6.70179* g.p5+g.cxps -4.2R32*e.p7 -c.cx p,<;=O.
6.70179*h.pS+h,exps -IS.17*c.ppl-c.exps=O.
24, 7lJ J7*g.pn+g.cxps -4.2812* f.p7 -f.exp.s:::O,
24,7917*h.p6+h.exps-IS. 17*fppJ-fcxps=O.
4.2832*h,p7+h.cxps-15.17*g.ppl-g.exps:::O;
run,
run;
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